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INTRODUCTION
In addressing the questions aptly presented by the Conference title-
"Need for and Structure of a Class Action Rule for Mississippi"-this pa-
per examines several issues facing both Mississippi and federal lawmakers
in the wake of recent major reforms to the state's and the nation's civil
liability systems. In Mississippi, courts and legislators have greatly re-
stricted the use of joinder rules to aggregate "mass tort," antitrust, employ-
ment discrimination, environmental, and other types of multi-claim
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"accident" litigations.1 As a result, Mississippi is now the only state with-
out a class action rule or other formal process for aggregating numerous,
similar claims.2 At the federal level, Congress has recently passed the Class
Action Fairness Act, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over most
large-scale, interstate aggregate litigations.3 In effect, both Mississippi and
the federal government are grappling with exactly what to do with class
actions. Mississippi, however, has the unique opportunity to write a pre-
scription for the future treatment of such cases on a relatively clean slate-
a prescription that could pave the way for a more widespread change in the
way class action are currently administered. Our analysis of "need" and
"structure" for class actions thus takes this opportunity for charting a new
course to heart.
Our central conclusion is that the mandatory litigation class action-
mandatory both in automatic certification and no opt-out-is the most ef-
fective means of dealing with such litigations. To serve civil liability's
objectives of enhancing individual well-being, the class action mechanism
we propose would decouple liability determination from damage distribu-
tion. Accordingly, the first stage of adjudication would decide liability and
assess damages in the aggregate. This assures priority for risk reduction
(deterrence) and promotes welfare maximization by enabling individuals to
avoid harm from reasonably preventable risks. The second stage would,
when appropriate, apply standard insurance principles and practices to dis-
tribute aggregate damages among class members. Adopting our class ac-
tion model would put Mississippi on a different path from states that have
modeled their class action rules on Federal Rule 23, whose subsection
(b)(3) calls for conditional certification and opt-out requirement.4 We be-
lieve, however, that the boldest approach is the best in this case.
Mandatory litigation class action, we shall argue, represents the most work-
able and effective means for implementing the basic policy objectives of
civil liability.
We hasten to note that, in lacking comprehensive knowledge and di-
rect experience of the Mississippi system and practice of civil liability, we
necessarily consider these questions from an analytic distance. The new
1. See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Booth, 830 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 2002).
2. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So.2d 1092, 1102 (Miss. 2004) (Graves, J.,
concurring).
3. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 109 P.L. 2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). Under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, state class actions can be removed to federal court unless the aggregate amount in
controversy is less than $5 million, the case is almost completely localized, or the parties choose to
pursue the litigation in the state court. While the Class Action Fairness Act will undoubtedly have a
great impact on state class actions, an examination of the legislation is beyond the scope of this paper.
Indeed, the Act was signed into law on the day of the Symposium.
Our paper develops an alternative state-based approach to multi-state class actions that has rele-
vance to cases that are not removable or removed under the Class Action Fairness Act and to any
future reconsideration of its provisions by Congress. In any case, our arguments for mandatory class
action apply to both state and federal class actions equally.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (2005).
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status quo in Mississippi-adjudication of multiple similar claims by disag-
gregated means of separate, independent actions-might well be regarded
as unproblematic by those better situated than we are. Furthermore, we
acknowledge that the Class Action Fairness Act,' which grants federal
courts jurisdiction in most large-scale, interstate aggregate litigations, will
likely reduce both the number and magnitude of class actions brought
under any rule Mississippi may adopt. Nevertheless, whether applied to
relatively "small" class actions (those with an aggregate amount in contro-
versy of less than $5 million) in Mississippi state court, or relatively "large"
class actions in federal court, our motivating assumption for this paper re-
mains the same: litigations comprised of numerous similar claims present
problems for the civil liability system that call for consideration of a class
action solution.
It is also useful to specify at the outset what we regard as the key
problems with adjudicating multi-claim litigations in separate, independent
actions. Among the most salient surely is that disaggregated adjudication
can pervert litigated outcomes, undermining the use of civil liability as an
effective means of law enforcement. In particular, disaggregated adjudica-
tion impedes the use of civil liability as a means of promoting optimal de-
terrence (preventing unreasonable risks) and optimal insurance (replacing
losses according to severity of harm and need for compensation). This mat-
ter is of pressing concern, since suboptimal deterrence and insurance has
great consequences on individual well-being and overall social welfare.
The use of civil liability under study governs virtually all risk-taking by
mass producers-governments as well as businesses-and hence virtually
all civil litigation outside the realm of automobile cases. Litigations involv-
ing asbestos, tobacco, Enron, racial discrimination in farm subsidies, Three-
Mile Island, and atomic bomb radiation merely exemplify the significant
and varied potential for mass production designs and policies to place large
populations at greater chance of death, crippling disease and trauma, de-
struction of livelihood and property, invidious discrimination, fraud, anti-
competitive restraints on trade, and other major injuries to legally pro-
tected interests. It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that while mass
production processes, products, and services generate systematic risk, the
ability of businesses and governments to exploit the efficiencies of large-
scale, standardized means of production also increases individuals' chances
of surviving and prospering in this world of prevalent danger and scarce
resources. Indeed, but for the availability of mass production processes
and goods, most people in the world would be impoverished or dead.
Courts thus play an important role in the overall effort by the law
enforcement system to manage mass production risks. This law enforce-
ment effort consumes trillions of (net) dollars annually in seeking to reduce
these risks to reasonable, socially appropriate levels and to insure against
hazards that cannot be avoided by reasonable investment in precautions.
5. See supra note 3.
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Courts, like administrative and executive law enforcers, must strike the bal-
ance of benefit and risk from mass production that best enhances individ-
ual well-being. In the parlance of civil liability, the objective is to minimize
total accident costs, including the costs of precautions, unavoided harm,
insurance, and transactions (e.g., administrative and litigation). Even
under the most favorable circumstances, this task of marshaling, evaluating,
and taking appropriate action upon the relevant information is daunting.
The difficulties are evident from the complex questions of natural science,
technology, economics and other social sciences, and public policy posed by
the typical mass production case.
Take the example of a conventional product liability claim alleging
that the safety latch on a car door suffered from a design defect, which
resulted in the door opening and the plaintiff being thrown from the car in
a collision. The questions the court and jury must resolve are not limited to
the basic but hardly simple and uncomplicated inquiry of whether "the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and [that]
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe." 6 The decision-maker must also weigh the relative benefits and costs
of the product design in question against those of competing designs, re-
gardless of their commercial availability at the time of sale. In addition, the
alternative design must be assessed for feasibility and practicality, including
whether consumers could afford the costs of additional precautions. And
finally, because riskless products are generally unaffordable and often im-
practical, if not impossible, to use for their intended purposes,7 adjudica-
tion often requires further rationing of social resources by trading off one
set of risks against another. In the example, this rationing might involve
calculating the point on the margin at which a stronger safety latch lowers
risk of occupants being thrown from cars less than it increases the risk of
limiting their egress in case of fire.
Moreover, in any given case of a single consumer prosecuting a defec-
tive design claim, the court and jury must, by virtue of the unitary nature of
mass production designs and policies, determine liability "class-wide."
That is, adjudication of the particular case entails applying the benefit-risk
analysis to assess the reasonableness of the design for all prospective con-
sumers, uses, and conditions in the aggregate. Thus, to the extent we are
aiming to improve safety without preempting mass production completely,
the determination of civil liability for mass production risk can never be
individualized to the particular plaintiff. Rather, it must be based on a
judgment that the design as a whole was either unreasonable or reasonable
for everyone whose legally protected interests might be affected by it.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1997).
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("Society
does not benefit from products that are excessively safe-for example, automobiles designed with maxi-
mum speeds of 20 miles per hour-any more than it benefits from products that are too risky. Society
benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved.").
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While often overlooked, this point can be generalized to all cases of mass
production risk and must be kept front and center in considering the utility
of class actions.
There is substantial doubt concerning whether courts possess the re-
sources to perform these law enforcement tasks effectively. This skepti-
cism about the ability of courts to make "complicated fact-finding and...
debatable social judgment[s]" recently prompted the Supreme Court to
conclude that in enacting ERISA, Congress preempted mass tort-type
medical malpractice suits against HMOs, challenging their use of financial
incentives to induce physician compliance with the insurer's medical ser-
vice guidelines.8 Regardless of whether one shares this rather pessimistic
outlook, there should be no gainsaying the need for courts to make every
effort to increase the resources available for adjudicating mass production
cases. With the civil liability system already allocating hundreds of billions
of dollars in social resources annually, not to mention the lives and social
welfare that also hang in the balance, it is inconceivable that courts
should-by neglect or by sheer profligacy-fail to make needed reforms,
let alone continue to work at cross purposes to the ends of law.
In addition to providing social context for the following analysis, we
have emphasized problems that call for a class action solution to counter
the tendency of some class action critics to minimize the costs of separate,
independent adjudication. Some critics dismiss these costs as merely the
routine messiness of civil litigation. 9 Others characterize these costs as sim-
ply the price we must pay to preserve individual "autonomy," however un-
real and self-destructive the choice to sue "solo."1 ° Indeed, the choice is
stark because the stakes are high. As we conclude, nothing short of com-
plete collectivization of all claims assures that civil liability can accomplish
its law enforcement mission of optimally deterring unreasonable risk and,
when appropriate, optimally insuring harm from reasonable risk. Part I
develops the grounds for this conclusion. It extends the argument by dem-
onstrating that the conclusion holds even if all claims are prosecuted sepa-
rately or in any combination short of full collectivization. It then goes on
to explain why only mandatory class action can secure the optimal degree
of collectivization. Finally, the workings of the envisioned mandatory class
8. See Pegram v Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220-22 (2000) ("(C)omplicated fact-finding and ...
debatable social judgment(s) are not wisely required of courts .... We think, then, that courts are not in
a position to derive a sound legal principle to differentiate an HMO like [defendant] Carle from other
HMOs.").
9. John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 998.
10. See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action,
115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2002) (quoting Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997)). As will be discussed further below, see infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text, commenta-
tors who sing the praises of plaintiff autonomy largely (i) ignore evidence that plaintiffs show a prefer-
ence for optimally deterring unreasonable risk and compensating harm from reasonable risk over
autonomy; (ii) dismiss the fact that exercising plaintiff autonomy via opt-out comes at the price of
increased risk to everyone; and (iii) completely disregard the fact that the costs of opt-out are subop-
timal deterrence and insurance, both of which leave everyone worse off.
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action are elaborated. Proceeding to Part II, we explain why Rule 23, de-
spite supplying a ready template, is a poor class action rule model. Al-
though it provides mandatory collectivization to some extent for cases
qualifying for (b)(1) and (b)(2) treatment, Rule 23 creates a substantial
enforcement gap by needlessly relegating many cases to separate-action ad-
judication. We close this part with a discussion of plaintiff "autonomy" and
other anti-collectivist objections to mandatory class action and the instru-
mental uses claimed for opt-out. In Part III we address several core ques-
tions bearing on the structuring, operation, and scope of collectivization.
In particular, we first argue that class action should be convened automati-
cally and immediately based on the filing of the first, actualized harm claim,
encompassing all potential claims, without delay for "maturation" through
pre-certification separate actions. Second, we explain why litigation class
actions are superior, and in all ways preferable, to settlement-only class
actions. Third, we discuss the conditions under which Mississippi should
conduct a multi-state class action."' And finally, we proffer remedies for
the problems (assuming their reality) of "sweetheart" and "blackmail"
class settlements.
I. THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY CLASS ACTIONS
Our argument proceeds from the fundamental premise that the legal
system should aim to maximize individual welfare. That is, given that there
is no costless way to reduce mass production hazards to zero, the legal sys-
tem ought to manage this unavoidable risk according to the mode of adju-
dication an individual would rationally choose in seeking maximum
welfare.12 To discern that preference, we adopt a perspective that puts the
individual "behind a veil of ignorance."' 3 Aiming to maximize well-being
regardless of what fate has in store, the individual rationally chooses the
legal system that maximizes welfare by minimizing the sum of accident
costs.1 4 Specifically, the preferred legal system would employ civil liability
11. Obviously, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has largely eliminated many of the
problems Mississippi would face in adjudicating large-scale, multi-state class actions by granting federal
courts jurisdiction in most such litigations. However, even "localized" cases (cases where over two-
thirds of the class members and the primary defendants are Mississippi residents) may implicate the
laws and interests, as well as residents, of other states. Therefore, though the passage of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 relieves state courts of most large-scale, multi-state class actions, some such
litigations will remain, and thus our arguments as to the need and process for multi-state, including
nationwide and, in the appropriate case, international class actions also remains relevant.
12. In deriving the contours of the legal system based on the rational preferences of a single,
welfare-maximizing individual, this analysis draws on work developing and applying the "behind the
veil of ignorance" perspective in normative theories of individual rational choice. Most notably, see
John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc. RES. 623 (1977). See also
CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 204
(Harvard Univ. Press 1970); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AvE. 283 (1981); John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press 1971).
13. Rawls, supra note 12, at 136.
14. Our argument broadens the normative framework developed in Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970).
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to optimally deter unreasonable risk-taking 5 and to optimally insure acci-
dent victims once harm materializes. Absolutely essential to this discussion
is the realization that the individual would rationally prefer a legal system
that prevents unreasonable risk, rather than one that simply compensates
for it. We then go on to demonstrate that the only way to achieve optimal
deterrence and insurance is through collective adjudication. The third part
of this discussion explains why courts must intervene and not leave the
process of collectivization to market forces as we presently do. In particu-
lar, we argue that courts should apply the mast-tying mechanism of
mandatory class action to overcome collective action problems. The fourth
and final part of this discussion describes the contours of our proposed
mandatory class action mechanism. Our overall conclusion is this: adjudi-
cation through mandatory class action is essential to achieving the norma-
tive goals of optimal deterrence and insurance, which enhance the well-
being of everyone.
A. Behind the Veil of Ignorance
We adopt the perspective of an individual behind the veil of ignorance
because sound legal policymaking could not be accomplished otherwise.
Since a decision-maker standing behind the veil of ignorance could be any-
one with a probability corresponding to the actual demographics of the
world to come, the individual's choice of legal system under those condi-
tions of uncertainty will maximize his or her expected welfare by maximiz-
ing the welfare of everyone across all states of the world. This behind-the-
veil-of-ignorance perspective is thus compelling not only because it is the
only decision point for making rational choices that can maximize overall
welfare, but also because those choices express common, unprejudiced in-
terests. It is these common, unprejudiced interests-not the self-interested
preferences that arise once the future is revealed-that will provide a relia-
ble as well as respected basis for legal policymaking. 6
15. Throughout this paper, we define unreasonable risks as those risks that are more costly to
bear than to avoid. That is, a risk that imposes $100 of harm and costs $50 to avoid is unreasonable. On
the other hand, a risk that imposes $50 of harm but would cost $100 to avoid is reasonable.
16. Some commentators deny the importance of the behind-veil-of-ignorance perspective. See,
e.g., Jules L. Coleman, RISKS AND WRONGS 180-81 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). They do not deny that
such a perspective is impartial. Neither do they deny that predicating policy outcomes on individuals'
preferences once the future is revealed simply recreates a Hobbesian state of nature, pitting each
against all (or more accurately, the lucky against the unlucky). Rather, these critics claim that such a
perspective is too hypothetical, too unrealistic. We disagree. As alluded to before, the behind-the-veil-
of-ignorance perspective is essential for analyzing legal policy. This is true because it provides a robust
critical benchmark against which legal policy can be measured. Indeed, we often want and expect
legislators and judges to assume such a perspective because it restrains self-dealing and forces
lawmakers to take into account the preferences of all individuals, instead of relying on (or protecting)
the interests of the privileged few. Furthermore, the behind-the-veil-of-ignorance perspective is em-
ployed on a daily basis by our courts, corporations, and fellow citizens. Courts use it to interpret and
enforce contracts; corporations use it to decide how to structure their enterprises; and individuals use it
to decide how much insurance to buy. Certainly, there can be little doubt that the behind-the-veil-of-
ignorance perspective is not only widely-employed, but also critical to structuring and evaluating our
social institutions.
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B. Minimizing Total Accident Costs
Having recognized the normative appeal of the behind-the-veil-of-ig-
norance perspective, we must now decide what that means in terms of se-
lecting a legal system. As we discussed above, this perspective places a
single individual behind a veil of ignorance concerning his or her future
prospects in a world characterized by scarce resources and accident risks.
Essentially, the individual ex ante internalizes the ex post reality of all pos-
sible fates (including preferences for and reactions to available options and
outcomes) of all possible people. Aiming to maximize well-being no mat-
ter what this future has in store, the individual rationally selects a legal
system that minimizes the sum of accident costs.17 Such a conclusion logi-
cally flows from the overwhelming evidence that people, though differing
in their subjective valuations, prefer to avoid what they respectively deem
"unreasonable" accident cost and from the axiomatic proposition that effi-
cient reduction of accident costs increases individuals' net welfare across all
possible states of the world. In other words, an individual who wishes to
maximize his or her own share of social welfare would rationally choose a
legal system that maximizes welfare overall.
To illustrate this point, we use a stylized example taken from a Third
Circuit case regarding advertising practices in the insurance industry.' 8 As-
sume that an insurance company that has a total wealth of $10,000 engages
in advertising practices that cause ten percent of those who buy their insur-
ance to suffer $100 of harm. 9 Assume further that 100 people purchase
the company's insurance and that each individual begins with a total wealth
of $100 (for a total wealth of $10,000). Without taking any precautions, the
insurance company will impose $1,000 of harm on the purchasers ($100 of
harm on 10 purchasers). Total individual wealth (for present purposes,
equatable with total individual welfare) will therefore be $19,000 (the com-
pany's net worth of $10,000 + the purchasers' net worth of $10,000 - the
$1,000 of harm). Ignorant of whether he or she will be the insurer or the
insured, the individual standing behind the veil of ignorance internalizes all
possibilities: 1/101 chance of having a wealth of $10,000 + 90/101 chance of
having a wealth of $100 + 10/101 chance of having a wealth of $0. Thus, the
average total wealth of all individuals in all states of this tiny world is
17. Our conception of rationality consists of the three simple axioms that comprise the founda-
tion of rational choice theory-the study of individual choice under conditions of uncertainty and risk
that undergirds the basic theories of law enforcement (including general deterrence) and of insurance.
See generally Harsanyi, supra note 12. First, we assume that individuals compare all alternatives con-
sistently, meaning that if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. Second,
we assume that individuals prefer a lottery with more valuable prizes to a lottery with the same
probabilities but in which one or more of the prizes is less valuable. Third, we assume that individuals
have continuous preferences, so that a small shift in the value of an outcome would not produce a
drastic shift in individuals' valuation of that outcome. These axioms supply the complete basis for
proving that individuals will maximize the expectation of their utility-that is, the sum of the utilities
corresponding to each outcome weighted by the probability that each outcome will be realized.
18. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 1998).
19. Realize, of course, that a great number of people who actually need insurance will be helped
by the practice.
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$188.12. Assume now, that if the company spends $100 on modifications to
its sales practices, it will cut the risk of harm in half (5%). Here, the total
wealth would increase to $19,600 (the company's net worth of $10,000 + the
purchasers' net worth of $10,000 - the $500 of harm - the $100 of precau-
tions). Now, internalization of all possibilities is as follows: 1/101 chance of
having a total wealth of $9,900 + 95/101 chance of having a total wealth of
$100 + 5/101 chance of having a total wealth of $0. Thus, the average total
wealth of all individuals in all states of this tiny world is $192.08. Hence,
the individual standing behind the veil of ignorance would select a legal
system that compels the insurance company to take the above-mentioned
precaution, since it improves his or her chances of obtaining more wealth.
Indeed, the individual would prefer a legal system that compels the entity
imposing the risk to incur costs of precautions up to the point at which the
expense of taking an additional unit of precaution exceeds the benefit of
the additional risk avoided.
The question then becomes, how should the legal system go about
minimizing the sum of accident costs? We believe that the most effective
way to accomplish this task is by employing civil liability (assuming the
need for judicial risk management in the first place) to provide optimal
deterrence of unreasonable risk-taking and optimal insurance to compen-
sate for loss once residual, reasonable risks result in any case of actualized
harm.
1. Optimal Deterrence
Optimal deterrence entails threatening defendants with liability for the
total costs of their unreasonable conduct. By doing so, it gives defendants
the proper financial incentives to invest efficiently in precautions. That is,
it provides them with the proper incentives to incur the cost of precaution
up to the point at which the expense of taking an additional unit of precau-
tion would exceed the benefit of risk avoided. As illustrated in the exam-
ple above, this regime maximizes each individual's expected welfare by
maximizing the amount of welfare overall.
2. Optimal Insurance
Individuals are concerned not only with the probability of accident,
but also the magnitude of the potential economic loss relative to their
wealth. Thus, the individual standing behind the veil of ignorance would be
willing to purchase insurance against loss from the residual, reasonable risk
that optimal deterrence cannot prevent. The theory of optimal insurance
holds that because risk-averse individuals derive diminishing marginal util-
ity from money, they will rationally agree to pay certain insurance premi-
ums to obtain full-not more or less-compensation for accident losses
they might suffer at some future time. Full coverage is optimal because it
represents the point at which further investment in premiums yields nega-
tive marginal net benefits. Before reaching full coverage, each additional
unit of insurance coverage increases the individual's utility from wealth if
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he or she suffers an accident more than it diminishes the individual's utility
from wealth if he or she does not suffer an accident. Full insurance cover-
age thus equalizes the individual's marginal utility from wealth between the
accident and no-accident states and thus increases expected utility.2"
3. Preference for Optimally Deterring Unreasonable Risk
To the extent that enhancing individual welfare is the goal of law, the
individual standing behind the veil of ignorance would reject a legal system
that deployed scarce resources to insure, rather than deter, unreasonable
risk-taking. By definition, the costs of preventing unreasonable risk are
lower than the costs of compensating loss resulting from such risk. Once
risk materializes into harm it imposes losses that greatly exceed liability-
in addition to the immediate losses sustained by the harmed individuals,
they must also bear the cost of litigation, and society as a whole must shoul-
der the cost of adjudicating claims. The welfare-maximizing individual
would always prefer to avoid such squandering of social resources.
C. The Need for Collective Adjudication
To achieve the normative goals of optimal deterrence and insurance
outlined above, the legal system must reflect and adapt to the society in
which it operates. In the case of twenty-first-century Mississippi (and
America as a whole), that means a legal system capable of dealing with a
society whose livelihood depends largely on mass production processes and
goods. Undoubtedly, mass production has benefited American society
greatly. Standardized police forces provide safety for ourselves and our
families, large-scale agricultural organizations provide food at affordable
prices, and well-capitalized pharmaceutical companies provide drugs that
help us live longer, more fulfilling lives. However, these benefits come at a
cost of accident risk.
In the typical mass production case, a defendant or small group of de-
fendants are alleged to have harmed a great multitude of individuals. Cog-
nizant that all claims will present a nucleus of common issues of law and
fact that determine across-the-board liability (in addition to the issues pe-
culiar to each claimant that determine whether and the amount he or she
shall recover in damages), the defendant invests optimally in the litigation
and then spreads the cost over however many cases are ultimately brought.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, must individually shoulder the entire cost of
litigating both common and non-common questions in the individualized,
case-by-case system of adjudication. Such a situation handicaps their abil-
ity to match defendants' investment because their incentive to invest is lim-
ited to their individual expected returns (their individual liability). In other
20. For example, if an individual whose total wealth is $100 is subject to a 1% chance of suffering
$100 of harm, the individual would rationally pay $1 to purchase $100 of insurance. In the no-accident
state, the individual's wealth would be $99 ($100 original wealth - $1 premium). Likewise, in the acci-
dent state the individual's wealth would be $99 ($100 of insurance proceeds - $1 premium).
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words, only the defendant fully exploits available litigation scale efficien-
cies. The only way to ameliorate this asymmetry of investment-which un-
dermines the normative goals of deterrence and insurance by skewing
outcomes on average in favor of mass production defendants-is through
optimizing litigant investment via the class action mechanism.2' By aggre-
gating all claims, plaintiffs would have the same opportunity to exploit liti-
gation scale efficiencies that defendants naturally enjoy. Furthermore, the
21. Of course, the hallmark of mass production cases is that few claims are prosecuted indepen-
dently, at least when free-riding on the work product of others is taken into account. Rather, even in
the absence of a class action, attorneys compete to acquire shares of actual and potential claims, cus-
tomarily using various formal and informal aggregation measures, ranging from cooperative arrange-
ments to share expenses and information to claim inventories, joinder, and consolidation. See Howard
M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 519, 532-50 (2003). However, such fractional aggregation short
of comprehensive collectivization by class action or a functional equivalent, never assures the full op-
portunity to exploit scale efficiencies that would enable plaintiffs to maximize the civil liability benefits
of deterrence and insurance. Erichson appears to deny the need for universal aggregation, commenting
that "[t]he possibility of a large recovery may provide sufficient incentive for a skilled lawyer to pursue
[the] claim [of a group of high-damages individuals] vigorously." Id. at 551. But whatever he means by
"vigorously," and beyond his implicit concession that the lawyer may not have sufficient incentive,
Erichson misses the central point. No investment in litigation, however "vigorous," is optimal when
scale efficiencies remain untapped, and scale efficiencies always remain untapped when the plaintiffs'
attorney expects to recover less than the full value of all claims. Hence, though "vigorous," the lawyer
whose representation forsakes available scale efficiencies is inadequate as measured by the social objec-
tive of mass production liability - minimization of total accident costs through optimal deterrence and
insurance. Extracting full value from available scale efficiencies is a basic principle governing all types
of business investment. See Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel R. Rubinfeld, M1CROECONoMIcs 197-99 (4th
ed. 1998). Its direct and unqualified application to plaintiff attorney investments in mass production
litigation would seem all the more imperative in view of the high risks and outlays involved. (Erichson
mistakenly focuses on the gross and absolute payout, the "large recovery," rather than realistically
assessing the return as an expected net value, which may very well reduce the prospect of the large
recovery to a pittance.)
While accepting the standard theory of business investment and its application to mass production
litigation, Erichson nevertheless suggests society can get along without universal aggregation of mass
production claims because a lawyer with some fractional share of the claims may hit the jackpot without
making the optimal investment. Even assuming the lawyer could win this game of chance, an unreal
prospect, turning law enforcement into such a lottery is hardly a prescription for the rational, let alone
socially responsible, design of a civil liability system aimed at protecting the life, limb, and livelihood of
people. However, it is sheer fantasy to suppose a plaintiffs' attorney could win such a game of chance
(winning in the sense that a sub-optimal investment could achieve the social objective of optimal deter-
rence and insurance). Indeed Erichson offers no evidence or example of this occurring. On the "qual-
ity" dimension of scale efficiencies, the reality is that plaintiffs' attorneys have continuous opportunities
for investing time and money to increase the probability of success at trial and correspondingly the
payout from settlement. As such, the diminishing marginal return from litigation scale shifts from posi-
tive to negative at the point when the net aggregate recovery from all mass production claims is maxi-
mized. That shift will occur sooner, auguring lower deterrence and insurance value, when the net
aggregate recovery derives from less than all such claims. On the "cost" dimension of scale efficiencies,
only universal aggregation can provide the vehicle for optimally investing not only to reduce litigation
cost, but also to spread it across claims. The latter benefit is particularly significant for settlement.
Absent universal aggregation, the defendant's superior scale efficiencies enable it to reduce per claim
costs more effectively than can the plaintiff and thus to shift the settlement mean in the direction of the
plaintiff's minimum demand, again auguring lower deterrence and insurance value. See David Rosen-
berg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393,
415-418 (2000).
In short, total aggregation is necessary to provide plaintiffs and courts a full opportunity and incen-
tive to exploit scale efficiencies in litigation to counter the asymmetry in litigation power favoring de-
fendants that results from their ability to exploit de facto class action scale efficiencies in the standard
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class action mechanism would have the added benefit of motivating courts
to invest optimally in adjudicating such claims, which typically involve com-
plex matters of fact, law, evidence, and policy. Class actions thus offer the
only avenue for optimizing both litigant and adjudicative investment in
mass production litigation.
1. Optimal Litigant Investment
It is a widely shared belief that class actions should be available to
plaintiffs whose individual claims are so small that litigating them individu-
ally would be uneconomical.22 Only by aggregating these claims and
spreading the cost of prosecuting them across the entire class-exploiting
efficiencies of scale-can such plaintiffs vindicate their rights.2 3 We believe
this rationale holds true not merely in "small claims" cases, but in all cases.
Only by exploiting the efficiencies of scale that defendants naturally enjoy
can plaintiffs fully vindicate their rights (i.e., achieve optimal deterrence
and insurance).24 Put another way, the class action is desirable in all cases
because it removes the artificial and unjustified advantage that defendants
have in separately-prosecuted or fractionated-class claims, allowing plain-
tiffs to make more productive litigation investments.25
separate action process. While it is more realistic to talk in terms of fractional aggregation, and we do
at later points of discussion, it would not change the basics of our present analysis and conclusions.
22. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 ("The policy at the very core of the class action mecha-
nism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.").
23. Taking a cue from the venerable case of Barrett v. Coullet, 263 So.2d 764 (Miss. 1972), as-
sume 50,000 individuals purchase tickets to watch a sporting event at a cost of $50 per ticket. Thanks to
blundering by the vendor, the televised event has to be canceled. However, instead of refunding the
price of the tickets, the vendor does nothing. Since any single plaintiff could recover at most $50 (as-
suming punitive damages are unavailable) for his breach of contract claim, there is little chance an
attorney would take the case. However, if the ticket-buyers were certified as a class, the aggregate
recovery would potentially reach $2.5 million, easily enough to provide fees to competent counsel. As
is evident, the class action mechanism makes these claims economically viable by allowing the plaintiffs
to spread the cost of representation across all 50,000 claimants, instead of forcing each individual to
shoulder the entire cost of legal representation. While it is true the attorney will take a small portion of
each individual's $50 recovery as compensation, without his services, the plaintiffs would recover
nothing.
24. Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Ac-
tions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1382 (2000). As will be discussed throughout
this section, mandatory class actions help achieve optimal deterrence and insurance by allowing plain-
tiffs to match whatever defendants are prepared to invest in litigation expenses. By eliminating the
disparities in investment that inhere in the standard market process of litigating claims individually,
skewed outcomes in favor of defendants will decrease and defendants will internalize the proper cost of
precautions, instead of relying on their superior litigation abilities to afford them the luxury of taking
unreasonable risk in mass-production decisions.
25. By more productive, we mean more cost-effective. In the standard process of litigating
claims individually, each plaintiff wastes vast resources duplicating the efforts of similarly situated
plaintiffs in parallel suits. Class action eliminates this wasteful duplication. In fact, the cost to each
plaintiff would decrease by even more than what is wasted on duplicative litigation-plaintiffs could
spread all litigation costs over the entire class, thus reducing the marginal cost of all litigation expenses
borne by each individual plaintiff. Furthermore, the quality of representation would be vastly im-
proved by mandatory class actions. Although the overall cost per claim in absolute dollar terms would
likely increase, since optimal investment might warrant, for example, retention of better and often more
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When claims are litigated individually, the defendant enjoys an auto-
matic "upper hand," thanks to an ability to take advantage of efficiencies
of scale. Whether the potential recovery of each plaintiff is a hundred, a
thousand, or a million dollars, the defendant will treat any common issues
as a single litigation unit, making a substantial investment and then spread-
ing the cost across however many cases plaintiffs bring. Individual plain-
tiffs, on the other hand, are hampered by their inability to spread litigation
costs. Each plaintiff must internalize the entire cost of litigating both the
common questions and those issues particular to his claim. Since the de-
fendant's marginal cost of litigating the common issues is much lower, he is
able to invest much more in defending them than any single plaintiff could.
Furthermore, thanks to the reduced marginal cost of the common issues,
defendants can also spend much more litigating the issues particular to
each plaintiff. The defendants' litigation position is therefore strengthened
not because of anything having to do with the merits of the lawsuit, but
solely because the plaintiffs are atomized.26
To illustrate this point, let us return to the insurance company example
above. This time, however, assume that 25,000 individuals have purchased
the insurance and that the level of harm inflicted on ten percent of the
purchasers is $100,000 per individual-seemingly enough to make each
claim economical. Thus, aggregate liability would equal $250,000,000.27
Each case presents common issues, such as the level of warnings and
whether or not the advertising practices actually caused the plaintiff any
harm. Since the defendant treats liability in the aggregate, it will invest a
large amount of money-say $10,000,000-defending against any allega-
tions that are common to the class. Defendant's marginal cost of defending
against these allegations is thus $4,000 dollars per plaintiff ($10,000,000/
2,500 plaintiffs). An individual plaintiff, on the other hand, cannot spread
his costs. Thus, with a maximum potential recovery of $100,000, a plaintiff
would be able to spend only a small fraction of what the defendant has
spent on proving/disproving common issues. Furthermore, the defendant
will easily be able to outspend individual plaintiffs on the issues particular
to each case because the defendant's marginal cost of defending the com-
mon issues is so low. 28 With such a disparity in investment, there is little
doubt that skewed outcomes will ensue.
expensive experts, the greater cost would be more than offset by the greater expected return, since
optimal investment in the litigation will generally raise the aggregate and thus per claim expected
recovery.
26. In effect, the defendant is able to use the plaintiffs' numbers against them. Even though
tortious harm could reach into the millions of dollars, the defendant may be able to skirt liability alto-
gether, so long as it disperses this harm across enough individuals. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 24, at
1379-80.
27. 2,500 individuals x $100,000/individual = $250,000,000.
28. For example, in the hypothetical at hand, the defendant's marginal cost of defending the
common issues is $4,000/plaintiff. Each plaintiff, on the other hand, must spend much more to prose-
cute the common issues to even approach a fraction of the $10 million the defendant initially expended.
Hamstrung by this attempt to match his adversary's investment in litigation expenses, the individual
plaintiff will have very little money left over to prosecute the non-common issues.
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Class action aggregation helps reduce this asymmetry, giving plaintiffs
the opportunity to exploit the scale efficiencies defendants already possess.
However, once plaintiffs begin opting-out of the class or the class is frac-
tionated, by sub-classing, for example, the asymmetry of investment begins
to accrue, skewing outcomes in favor of the defendant once more.29 Such
non-mutual access to scale efficiencies undermines the primary goals of the
legal system-effective and administratively efficient deterrence and com-
pensation. Defendants simply do not have the proper legal incentives to
prevent unreasonable risk when the benefit of reduced liability from out-
spending individual or fractionated groups of plaintiffs outweighs the cost
of taking proper precautions. 30 The only way to provide defendants with
proper incentives is through collective adjudication, thus ensuring optimal
investment on the part of plaintiffs. In approving the availability of class
actions to aggregate "small" claims that have no economic viability as sepa-
rate actions, the Supreme Court implicitly accepts this point but apparently
fails to recognize its general significance.3' The central rationale for class
action aggregation applies not merely to cases comprised of uneconomical
claims, but to all cases involving numerous claims for damages, so long as
the claims arise from a single tortious transaction or occurrence.
Class actions have the potential to force defendants to internalize the
proper level of risk (i.e., achieve optimal deterrence) by eliminating the
skewed outcomes that result from systematic plaintiff under-investment. In
addition to achieving optimal deterrence, this parity of investment would
also further the goal of optimal insurance by providing plaintiffs with the
greatest and surest replacement of their loss. In other words, in cases
where plaintiffs suffer harms as a result of sanctionable risk-taking, they
29. As an illustration, let us revisit the example from above. However, this time, plaintiffs gather
together in groups of 250 plaintiffs each. Cognizant of the scale efficiencies afforded to plaintiffs by
partial aggregation, the defendant decides to spend 10% of its aggregate estimated liability
($25,000,000) defending common issues, raising the marginal cost to $10,000 per plaintiff ($25,000,000/
2,500 plaintiffs). To match this investment, plaintiffs must spend $100,000 each ($25,000,000/250 plain-
tiffs)-something they are unlikely to do, since the total value of each individual claim is only $100,000.
As is evident, even large groups of plaintiffs will not suffice to match the resources available to
defendants.
30. That is, if defendants are able to externalize part of costs of unreasonable risk-taking thanks
to superior litigation capacity, they will do so, as long as the externalized costs are greater than the costs
of litigating the claims.
31. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. The Court's purported distinction between "small" and "high
stake" claims is completely unrealistic. Many cases of severe injury or death involve complex issues of
science, public policy, fact, and law that render them uneconomical as separate actions. Indeed, as
discussed in the text, no mass production claim is prosecuted as a pure "separate action." The standard
separate action process is instead characterized by well-organized plaintiffs' attorneys investing on the
basis of actual or expected holdings of large inventories of claims in order to exploit scale efficiencies.
Some "boutique" firms specialize in claims with the high recovery values, normally comprising a tiny
fraction of all potential claims. However, the existence of "boutique" services hardly indicates an indi-
vidualist impulse, let alone a rational, well-informed choice, among plaintiffs to bear the enormous
expense and risks of going it alone. Claims remaining outside large-scale aggregations are more plausi-
bly explained by collective action barriers, especially high costs of locating and acquiring widely dis-
persed mass exposure claims, incentives to free ride and self-dealing by plaintiffs' attorneys. The
problem, as noted above, is that the market supply falls short of demand because of free riding and
other impediments and costs to effective coordination. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 24.
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would not have their recoveries reduced or eliminated simply because their
numbers preclude them from matching the defendant's investment in
litigation.
2. Optimal Adjudicative Investment
To the extent that judges rationally allocate judicial resources, class
action scale efficiencies are essential in motivating courts to optimize adju-
dicative investment, which maximizes the prospect of achieving the social
objectives of deterrence and insurance from mass production liability.32
Mistaken decisions by courts in mass production cases entail potentially
high social costs, including possible distortion of incentives. Such risks
threaten the benefits and even availability of mass production goods and
processes upon which the lives and livelihoods of most people depend.
These costs of error often justify courts' independently developing relevant
information, as well as supplementing and verifying the party-created re-
cord, to establish a comprehensive and reliable basis for making judg-
ments.33 Establishing an independent role in the litigation, however, is
costly for courts, given the highly specialized information they must ac-
quire, evaluate, and apply to adjudicate mass production claims. This in-
formation includes theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning
matters of science, technology, macroeconomics, statistics, regulation and
law enforcement, insurance, distributive policy, market conditions, and the
organization, finance, and practice of business.
Courts are apt to invest much less in developing and using information
to decide any fraction of classable claims in the standard market process.
Similar to free-riding attorneys, courts often merely copy-under rules of
stare decisis, estoppel, and precedent-what other courts have done or in-
corporate other courts' work by reference. Class action scale efficiencies
are thus necessary to motivate as well as to warrant the judicial investment
that maximizes the social value of class action adjudication of mass produc-
tion claims.
D. The Need for Mandatory Class Actions
Given the benefits outlined above, why do plaintiffs not voluntarily
aggregate all their claims to take advantage of the scale efficiencies defend-
ants automatically enjoy? Indeed, the real world of class action litigation is
characterized by well-structured organizations of plaintiffs' attorneys that
aggregate large numbers of claims, as well as sometimes share information
32. Although judges obviously have different motivations for investing in litigating mass produc-
tion cases, it is not unrealistic to assume that judges more or less consciously allocate judicial resources
to best effectuate the social objectives of the law they make and apply, and therefore, to some extent
exploit the value-enhancing opportunities of class action scale efficiencies.
33. For example, maximizing adjudicative investment may compel courts to appoint neutral ex-
perts more frequently. A practice outlined (but barely used) in Federal Rule of Evidence 706. FED. R.
EvID. 706 (dealing with court appointed experts).
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and costs. 34 These attorneys thus exploit scale efficiencies to some extent in
preparing common questions together. However, shifting preferences, the
high cost of voluntary organization, and a host of other factors prevent
plaintiffs from ever achieving optimal scale efficiencies. 35 Making class ac-
tions mandatory eliminates these problems by overriding the collective ac-
tion problems that plague the separate action and fractionated class action
methods of adjudication.
The fundamental barrier to voluntary aggregation of all claims stems
from the divergent preferences that arise once the future is revealed.
Think back to the behind-the-veil-of-ignorance perspective. Behind the
veil of ignorance, individuals' preferences are impartial and uniform-max-
imization of well-being across all people in all states of the world. How-
ever, once the veil of ignorance is raised, individuals are motivated not by a
collective interest in maximizing overall welfare, but by an individualized
interest in maximizing claim-related welfare. Behind the veil of ignorance,
the rational individual seeks to minimize the sum of accident costs by treat-
ing mass production claims as a collective asset to be allocated and redis-
tributed in order to achieve that purpose. Once the future is revealed,
however, the profit motive of "lucky" individuals (those who have strong
legal claims) impedes the level of voluntary cooperation needed to achieve
optimal deterrence and insurance.
In particular, individualized profit motives increase the transaction
costs of voluntary aggregation and encourage free-riding. First, the process
of voluntary joinder of claims entails substantial transaction costs due to
the wide dispersion of claims across time and territory. Not only are the
costs of search, evaluation, and acquisition of such claims prohibitive, but
also the costs of working out the terms of any voluntary aggregation largely
consume the benefits that would otherwise accrue from exploiting scale ef-
ficiencies. Second, free-riding plagues voluntary joint ventures. Much of a
lawyer's work product falls in the public domain, creating an incentive for
other attorneys who hold similar claims simply to exploit that work product
rather than pay the full price of developing the claims they hold. This dan-
ger is especially real in fractionated class actions, where attorneys attempt
to convince individuals who have high potential recoveries to opt-out of a
class that is certain to be prosecuted whether these class members remain
or exit.
The only way to overcome these impediments to optimal collective
action is by installing a legal system that makes class action aggregation
mandatory. Essentially, the legal system would mimic a contract in which
34. For a full discussion of how claims are aggregated whether or not formal aggregation proce-
dures exist, see generally Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions and the Inevitability of Mass
Aggregate Litigation, 24 Miss. C. L. REV. 285 (2005).
35. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 394 (2000).
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individuals were bound to honor their behind-the-veil-of-ignorance prefer-
ence for overall wealth maximization. Without such a mechanism, the nor-
mative goals of optimal deterrence and insurance are undermined, and all
individuals in society are left worse off.36
E. Mandatory Decoupled Class Actions
Our model for a mandatory class action mechanism consists of three
basic elements. First, to allow plaintiffs to exploit the scale efficiencies de-
fendants naturally possess, courts should automatically and immediately
aggregate all potential and filed claims arising from a mass production tor-
tious event into a single, mandatory class action, allowing no class member
to opt-out. Second, to achieve optimal deterrence, courts should determine
total aggregate liability and assess damages equal to the total level of sanc-
tionable harm (the "deterrence" stage). Third, to advance the goal of opti-
mal insurance, courts should distribute damages to class members
according to the relative severity of their loss rather than the relative
strength of their legal claims37 (the "compensation" stage). By separating
36. It has been suggested that cost-spreading effectuated by fractional aggregation may reduce
per claim litigation costs sufficient to render free riding largely unprofitable. See Howard M. Erichson,
Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 550 n. 117. Erichson offers no empirical support for his conjecture. It is
also analytically dubious. If the differential in per-claim cost is narrowing to discourage free riding, the
more plausible reason can be found in basic economic theory, which generally predicts a decrease in
incentive to invest when the resulting information or innovation is a public good. Consistent with that
explanation, the plaintiff attorney holding a fractional share of the claims will invest less, thereby reduc-
ing per-claim cost and the potential for marginal gain from free-riding. Of course, this strategy also
reduces the deterrence and insurance benefits from mass production liability. Indeed, there is some
evidence to contradict the supposition that the increasingly sophisticated use of fractional aggregation
over the past two or three decades has lowered per-claim costs. See, e.g., Tillinghast-Towers Perrin,
TORT COSTS TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995)(reporting 46% as U.S. plaintiffs' aver-
age recovery after attorneys' fees and costs subtracted from defendants' payments); Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin, TORT CosTs, 2000: TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM (2002)(re-
porting 42% as U.S. plaintiffs' average recovery after attorneys' fees and costs subtracted from defend-
ants' payments). Erichson also commits the common mistake of ignoring a major benefit of scale
efficiencies from aggregation, namely that the plaintiff attorney holding a fractional share of the claims
may in fact invest more to increase the quality of the case than he or she would if the share were
smaller. Consequently, per claim costs may rise substantially, albeit warranted by the greater increase
in marginal expected payoff per claim. On the realistic assumption that much of the increased benefit
from such a fractional aggregate investment will fall into the public domain, incentives to free-ride will
remain strong, resulting simultaneously in a reduction of expected return and thus motive for invest-
ment by plaintiffs' attorneys and, generally overlooked by courts and commentators, in an increase of
the number of separate actions and thus of the defendant's asymmetric investment advantage over the
plaintiffs. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1886 (2004). Ultimately, this collective action
problem poses a set of empirical questions such as how much aggregate claimholder investment and net
free-riding harm (less its network and other potential investor benefits, if any) occurs. Of course,
social welfare would not fare well even if there were no free riders, but rather multiple plaintiffs' attor-
neys actually investing in competition with one another, rather than merely copying each others' work
product. The result in that situation is not only sub-optimal investment, but also inflation of litigation
cost from wasteful duplication of effort. There is no escaping the need for universal aggregation on a
mandatory basis.
37. An exception to this distribution principle arises, however, when courts further individual
deterrence by, for instance, sanctioning contributory negligence. We discuss this process in more detail
below.
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the determination of aggregate liability from the distribution of damages,
this model "decouples" the deterrence and insurance functions of mass
production adjudication. Decoupling performance of these two functions
eliminates the traditional integrated approach, which generally results in
the defeat of either or both objectives.38 Decoupling adjudicates all com-
mon questions at the deterrence stage, where aggregate liability and dam-
ages are determined. This exclusive focus on common questions not only
maximizes benefits from scale efficiencies, it also assures that the class ac-
tion will achieve optimal deterrence even when the costs and risks of liti-
gating individual questions preclude recovery by some fraction of the class.
In other words, decoupling deterrence from compensation promotes the
latter goal without sacrificing the former, implementing a regulatory prior-
ity that leaves all individuals better off.
1. The Deterrence Stage
At the deterrence stage, the court achieves optimal deterrence by
making an aggregate determination of the mass production defendant's
class-wide liability and damages. As explained above, this aggregate liabil-
ity determination provides mass production defendants with the appropri-
ate incentives to invest optimally in precautions by threatening them with
monetary sanctions equal to the aggregate loss caused by their tortious
conduct. Assuming this first stage of aggregate liability and damage deter-
mination results in a judgment for the class, the court would then order the
defendant to pay these aggregate damages into a fund. The court would
also award attorneys' fees to provide class counsel with the appropriate
incentives to invest optimally in litigating the common questions, which are
determinative of aggregate liability and damages, and ultimately
deterrence.39
38. On the general concept and uses of decoupling to achieve optimal deterrence while lowering
enforcement costs, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives
for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991) (developing the approach based on theories of
law enforcement theory). Decoupling has been proposed to avoid excessive tort insurance from puni-
tive and nonpecuniary damages and to solve problems of under-deterrence resulting from strategic
judgment proofing by firms. See Keith H. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 449 (1998); Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, Using Decoupling
and Deep Pockets to Mitigate Judgment-proof Problems, 19 IrNr'L REV. L. & ECON. 275 (1999); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
921-23 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale, 1 MICH.
L. & PoL'v REV. 141, 157 (1996).
39. Since the goal of awarding attorneys' fees should be to motivate class counsel to invest opti-
mally in the litigation, the court should always determine attorneys' fees according to the aggregate
liability or settlement proceeds, whether or not a portion of these funds goes unclaimed. Those advo-
cating that courts should correlate class counsel fees to actual recovery, not aggregate judgment or
settlement value, seem motivated by concern that returning unclaimed funds to the defendant will un-
dercut deterrence. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Comments on a Class Action Rule for Mississippi, 24
Miss. C.L. REV. 309, 317 (2005). While the deterrence concern is well taken, the proposed solution is
not. Reducing class counsel fees as proposed could undermine deterrence just as would giving defend-
ants a reversionary interest in unclaimed funds. Even assuming courts could calculate the correct fee
discount, they must first determine whether class counsel failed to effect reasonable distribution of the
class settlement proceeds. In many cases, distributing damages to all class members simply costs too
much and class counsel should not be forced beyond the efficient point of distribution by threat of a fee
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For deterrence purposes, aggregate liability targets the mass produc-
tion decision, which generates the systematic risk giving rise to all claims.
That is, it targets the decision whose manifestation in a mass production
process or good systematically imposes an elevated level of risk on large
number of individuals. For purposes of deterring unreasonable risk-taking
in the design of mass production processes and goods, therefore, the only
relevant questions are those common to all claimants. Indeed, achieving
optimal deterrence in mass production cases does not require individualiz-
ing inquiries into, and evidence of, a defendant's liability and damages in
relation to a specific plaintiff or even any actual plaintiffs. Aside from
background historical issues such as whether, and if so, how the defendant
created the risk at issue, all the common questions that determine aggre-
gate liability and damages are statistical as well as aggregate in nature.
Thus, aggregate liability can be resolved based on streamlined methods of
scientific proof, including statistical sampling, modeling, and extrapolation.
Moreover, employing scientific methods produces synergistic gains from
scale efficiencies and investment, thereby increasing the overall effective-
ness and reliability of adjudicating mass production liability. In short, the
unitary nature of the mass production decision lends itself nicely to adjudi-
cation through a mechanism that decouples aggregate liability from indi-
vidual damages determinations.
2. The Compensation Stage
At the compensation stage, the court achieves optimal insurance by
averaging out claim-specific variables unrelated to severity of loss, thereby
redistributing claim-generated wealth from less to more severely harmed
class members. This redistribution of claim-related wealth reflects the indi-
vidual's behind-the-veil-of-ignorance preference for a legal system that of-
fers him or her the fullest and most reliable opportunity to recover any
tortious loss-a system where damages awards depend on severity of harm.
In need of tort insurance,4" the individual standing behind the veil of igno-
rance would not want compensation to reflect the strength of his or her
legal claim, which depends on numerous variables uncorrelated with sever-
ity of loss, such as differences in proof of defendant's causal responsibility,
reduction. For Erichson's fee-adjustment proposal to work, at least in principle, courts must be capable
of sorting slack from efficient performance by class counsel in cases of incomplete distribution. But
courts attempting to make such discriminating decisions would incur prohibitive information costs.
There is, however, a simple, straightforward solution: award class counsel fees based on aggregate judg-
ment or settlement value and, to the extent reversion of unclaimed funds would undercut deterrence,
deny reversion. If distribution of settlement proceeds serves a social goal, class or other counsel should
receive a separate appropriate fee to motivate efficient disbursement of the funds. Unclaimed monies
could be used for a number of different purposes, including funding the judicial system overall, thus
lowering taxes. For development of this argument and various proposals for effectuating efficient dis-
tribution of class action liability or settlement funds, see David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1895, 1917 &
n. 81 (2002).
40. We assume a systematic failure in the supply of first-party insurance from government as well
as commercial sources, and therefore a need for "tort insurance" to compensate accident loss.
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governing law, and competence of counsel. Rather, the individual would
prefer a legal system that bases compensation solely on severity of loss,
since such a regime would offer him the best chance of full recovery for
tortious loss. In essence, by basing individual recovery on severity of harm,
the court would be effectuating the insurance plan that the individual
would have personally established by contract with the defendant before
any harm had occurred, if not for bargaining and information costs.
To insist that "fairness" requires customizing awards according to vari-
ables other than severity of loss-such as claim strength-is to impress
upon individuals a system that makes everyone worse off. Standing behind
the veil of ignorance, the individual would never choose a system of insur-
ance in which the amount of compensation varies according to the outcome
of some event unrelated to severity of harm and need for compensation.
For example, the individual would never choose a system in which the com-
pensation covering medical costs of treating cancer depended on a coin
flip-$100,000 if heads, $200,000 if tails (or worse still, all-or-nothing). That
system would be inferior, in the eyes of a risk-averse individual, to one that
simply paid $150,000. This basic tenet holds not just for coin flips but for
any uncertain event that is unrelated to the severity of loss-be it the out-
come of a sporting event or the conclusion of a causation study. Rather
than chancing recovery of loss on a system of variable payments (in which
the amount paid depends on the outcome of an uncertain event), an indi-
vidual standing behind the veil of ignorance would always prefer a straight
fixed payment equal to the expected value of the variable payments. For
this reason, any proposed system providing variable payments-except
when their variation tracks the severity of loss-is, from an insurance
standpoint, unambiguously inferior to one providing the average of the va-
riable payments with certainty.
The only individualizing factor besides severity of loss that would af-
fect individual damage awards would be reasonableness of plaintiff con-
duct. In order to provide plaintiffs with the appropriate incentives to act
reasonably, individual awards would be reduced according to the portion of
loss attributable to the specific class member's unreasonable conduct. As-
sessment of the defendant's aggregate liability in the first stage could be
discounted by the average expected deduction that would be imposed for
unreasonable risk-taking (e.g. contributory negligence) by plaintiffs. Alter-
natively, no such reduction would take place until the compensation stage.
This would promote optimal deterrence in many cases by confronting the
defendant with damages equal to total tortious loss without a deduction for
the proportion that could have been avoided had plaintiffs taken reasona-
ble precautions. Hence, even though certain class members' recoveries
may be reduced or eliminated due to contributory negligence, the defen-
dant will nevertheless be optimally deterred from imposing unreasonable
risks.
Averaging or redistribution thus applies fully to every factor-factual,
legal, litigation, strategic, and otherwise-unrelated to severity of loss and
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individual deterrence. The implications of this principle are significant for
distributions from an aggregate damage award in a class action judgment or
settlement. It applies to all the paradigmatic mass production cases, re-
gardless of the defendant's solvency, the amount of individual loss and re-
lated damages at stake, and the differences in claim values and the time
when loss is incurred. Optimal insurance theory therefore censures efforts
to individualize mass production liability in the name of "plaintiff auton-
omy" or other conceptions of self-determination that disregard effects on
individual welfare, particularly on the well-being of those relying on tort
liability to supply insurance.
II. THE RULE 23 MODEL
From its promulgation in 1966, Rule 23 has set the basic pattern for
state class action rules. Indeed, most states modify their rules and practices
in accord with changes in terms and interpretations at the federal level.
While state rules deviate from the federal model and vary among them-
selves in significant ways, they retain key features of Rule 23 that preclude
our proposal for mandatory collectivization. In particular, most restrict use
of mandatory class actions to a category of cases encompassing only a por-
tion of those arising from mass production risks. Furthermore, most states
have affirmatively adopted provisions of Rule 23(b)(3), at least as currently
interpreted, that require courts to allow plaintiffs to opt-out before the
court considers initial certification, and most states follow the federal prac-
tice of allowing opt-out prior to judicial review of a proposed class settle-
ment; at least one state has adopted the recent amendments to Rule 23 that
encourage courts to afford opt-out before the settlement hearing and at
other later points in the litigation.41
The foregoing analysis shows that mandatory collectivization is neces-
sary to achieve the law enforcement objectives of civil liability and there-
fore to improve the lot of everyone whose lives and general well-being
depend on the benefits of mass production and optimal deterrence and in-
surance of its risks. Consequently, this Part will argue that Mississippi
should reject the Rule 23 model and take a new path. We begin by discuss-
ing the expansion of the scope of mandatory class action under Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) in recent decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. While the greater use of such class actions serves deterrence goals in
accord with the priority for preventing unreasonable risks, the courts' gen-
eral insistence on distributing damages according to claim strength pre-
cludes allocation of damages to promote insurance objectives. At its best,
moreover, the expanded scope of mandatory class action under Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) continues to leave a large law enforcement gap by sub-
jecting a major type of mass production cases to adjudication under Rule
41. Robert H. Klonoff, The Adoption of a Class Action Rule: Some Issues for Mississippi to
Consider, 24 Miss. C. L REV. 261, 271 (2005).
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23(b)(3). Essentially, this gap encompasses most, if not all, mass produc-
tion cases in which plaintiffs present claims for varying and relatively
"high" amounts of compensatory damages. When Rule 23(b)(3) criteria
are not read to preclude certification of such cases outright, its opt-out pro-
vision undermines the enforcement value of their class action treatment.
We show that both the certification criteria and opt-out requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3) provide nothing of instrumental or individualistic benefit to
class members, let alone society. Rather, this subsection promotes socially
detrimental behavior, free-riding by plaintiffs seeking gain at the expense
of other plaintiffs, and self-dealing by lawyers seeking profit not only from
free-riding, but also from charging fees for valueless service.
A. Mandatory Collectivization Under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) set forth different tests for convening
mandatory class actions, yet all are grounded on a core justification for
precluding opt-out. Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), class actions can be con-
vened for cases in which separate actions by or against individual class
members would risk establishing "incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class."'4 2 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) covers cases where the
prosecution of one or more separate actions would "as a practical matter
be dispositive of the interests" of nonparty class members or "substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."43 Rule 23(b)(2)
targets cases where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
"144class as a whole ....
We focus on the core justification for mandatory class actions underly-
ing these several provisions. For, while the drafters of Rule 23 apparently
formulated each test with some paradigmatic type of case in mind, the ex-
emplars are far from mutually exclusive. Indeed, they indicate substantial
overlap in the prescriptions and animating rationales for mandatory collec-
tivization. The unifying predicate is that the class exists as an integral
whole. That is, according to the Fifth Circuit, the class constitutes a "cohe-
sive group with few conflicting interests among its members. ' 45 This core
justification of cohesive group interest, as decisions in the Fifth Circuit indi-
cate, provides a foundation for significantly extending the Rule 23 authori-
zation for mandatory class action in mass production cases. We briefly
sketch out this broadened authorization and its apparent bounds.
Generally, the dispute in cases warranting mandatory class action cen-
ters on a compound of collective conduct by the prospective defendant and
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
45. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998). Please take note that
Rosenberg has recently invoked the "cohesion" concept to support a motion to certify a Rule 23
mandatory class action of deceptive lending practices claims, which is still pending. Baker v. Washing-
ton Mutual Finance of Mississippi, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 1:04CIV137GRO (S.D. Miss. __).
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collective relief sought against it. The key to mandatory collectivization is
thus the inability of courts to resolve such disputes in any particular sepa-
rate action without necessarily, or as a practical matter, materially affecting
everyone's interests. That result, however, can be of two sorts: substantial
or insubstantial. In some cases, group members' interests vary in expected
value, and in others, these interests are virtually uniform. Yet, in both
types of cases, group cohesion calls for mandatory collectivization.
At the extremes, the collective nature of one component-collective
conduct or collective relief-may dominate sufficiently to offset less unity
of interest in the other. Thus, cases involving limited common funds are
typically collectivized without allowance for opt-out even though group
members' claims against the fund are at base "individualistic" in nature,
presenting non-common questions that often result in claims of varying
value. Similarly, mandatory collectivization is the norm for shareholder
suits aimed at compelling the defendant corporation to declare a dividend,
despite the fact that each shareholder has an "individual" stake, which he
or she could readily enforce by separate action. The reason these cases
receive mandatory class action treatment stems from the collective conduct
of the defendant involved. That is, no separate action could go to judgment
without inevitably affecting the interests (allegedly protected by law) of
others in the group. In the case of a limited fund-where the collective
conduct consists of management's refusal (explicit or implicit) to distribute
monies pro rata instead of first-come, first-served-it is evident that a sepa-
rate action demanding pro-rata payout or the reverse will, relative to the
fund's policy, necessarily decrease the payout for some to increase the pay-
out for others. Likewise, the corporate dividend case involves collective
conduct that necessarily affects the interests of the stockholder group as a
whole. Thus, a separate action challenge to management's judgment to use
cash reserves on some long-term corporate project rather than pay it out in
dividends cannot avoid threatening to devalue the stockholdings of those
who would prefer investing the money in a project that comes with risk and
cost, but promises a greater payoff in the future.
Of course, while such "group cohesion" is an interdependency of inter-
est created by defendant's collective conduct, it is evident that not only are
members' interests individualistic in the sense that each seeks a particular
payoff (and indeed could sue for a judgment to that effect), but also in that
their interests are likely to conflict with one another. Nevertheless,
mandatory class action is called for precisely because these individualistic,
conflicted interests in how the court should ultimately resolve the question
of liability renders adjudication of a discrete claim impossible or impracti-
cable. In essence, despite often sharply differing interests among individu-
als, no such thing as a discrete individual claim exists. To be sure, as the
drafters of Rule 23 noted, the conflicts among the class in such a mandatory
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class action may require sub-classing (and, what they failed to note, distri-
bution of damages contrary to the prescriptions of insurance theory and the
real needs of class members).46
Analysis of the other extreme-where a collective remedy domi-
nates-yields the same conclusions. Thus, suits for declaratory judgments
or injunctions testing the legality of governmental conduct, such as a hike
in the tax rate applied to property, do not involve collective conduct in the
sense developed above. Each property owner can sue separately for a pro-
hibitory injunction against application of the higher tax rate to his or her
particular property. Those claims can be resolved separately without nec-
essarily affecting the interests of other property owners. If some owners
succeed in separate actions to void application of the tax to them, those
owners who favor the tax hike are not thereby aggrieved as property own-
ers, but rather, they suffer detriment to their interests as members of the
broader group of citizens. The collective character of the remedy being
sought not of the defendant's conduct creates the group cohesion that justi-
fies mandatory collectivization of these cases. In the tax case, the interests
of all property owners are necessarily resolved in a separate action because
it is a political if not a formal requirement for government, which is other-
wise bound to treat similarly situated group members alike, to generalize a
judgment for any one member as a judgment for all (or against one and
therefore all). Similarly, it is the collective character of the potential rem-
edy that justifies no-exit class action in certain types of employment dis-
crimination cases against business or government. For example, in cases
based on vicarious liability or on defendant's failure to adopt a policy of
restricting the discretion of local supervisors, employees may sue separately
for damages without necessarily affecting the interests of other employ-
ees. 47 However, mandatory collectivization is warranted if an employee
seeks an injunction or declaratory judgment that would require the em-
ployer to readjust the benefits, opportunities, or other conditions of em-
ployment for other employees, for example, in placing the plaintiff ahead
of some other employee on the seniority roster.
Some types of mass production cases lie at or near these extremes;
indeed, the classic exemplars are all mass production cases according to our
definition. However, the principal significance of Rule 23 mandatory class
action is measured by the case at the mean of all cases authorized for such
collective treatment. Between the extremes there is a wide spectrum of
cases involving some ratio of collective interest to disaggregated interest in
the conduct and remedy. Many types of mass production cases, even those
presenting "small claims," have been denied mandatory class action treat-
ment. The basic explanation is that, excepting limited fund cases, civil ac-
tions for damages generally do not present a problem of inconsistent
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
47. Of course, this is true only under the standard conception of civil liability that neglects the
collective interest in deterrence.
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judgments that would subject defendants to incompatible standards or im-
pair the ability of non-parties to protect their interests as required by Rule
23(b)(1). Nor do these actions usually qualify under Rule 23 (b)(2), which
has been read to require that injunctive and declaratory relief predominate
over the demand for damages.48 The fundamental error in this position is
its exclusive focus on the individual rather than the collective interests at
stake in mass production cases. The important advance in the Fifth Circuit
approach (as we see and read it) is to correct this error by redirecting the
inquiry to the question of "group cohesion." This approach effects a sub-
stantial shift in the mean point of cases accepted for mandatory class action
treatment under Rule 23.
The signal Fifth Circuit case is In re Monumental Life Insurance,49 a
suit by black insureds charging the defendant insurer with racial discrimi-
nation in the sale and administration of its policies. The court approved
Rule 23(b)(2) certification of what it characterized as the "ultimate nega-
tive value class action."5 The question at the heart of the case was
whether the requested injunctive relief predominated over the demand for
damages, which sought significant amounts in restitution.5' That question,
according to the court, was answered neither by trying to divine the plain-
tiffs' "primary goal" nor by engaging in the "wasteful and impossible task"
of determining predominance in "some quantifiable sense. "52 The better
approach, according to the court, was to assess class cohesiveness with the
focus on "defendants' alleged unlawful conduct, not on individual injury.
5 3
The court pursued the logic of its pragmatic position to the end in conclud-
ing that when the demand for damages does not sunder the cohesiveness of
group interests in challenging defendant's conduct, then mandatory class
certification may well be sustained notwithstanding the predominance of
the monetary remedies.54 One type of case where that could be true arises
when the monetary relief serves as a "group remedy," that is, it "flow[s]
directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis
of the injunctive or declaratory relief."55 Punitive damages might well
qualify as such a "group remedy"; notably, Mississippi law restricts the
48. Allison, 151 F.3d at 412-13.
49. 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004).
50. Id. at 411.
51. While the injunctive relief would prohibit collection of excessive premia on and reformation
of the policies in force, affecting a far from inconsiderable number of individuals (estimated between
one and 4.5 to 5.5 million), many if not most of the policies had been modified or claims settled to the
satisfaction of the policy holders prior to the filing for class action. Yet, as the court noted, even if the
injunctive relief were sufficient to deem it properly invoked on behalf of the class as a whole, the
question of predominance remained.
52. Id. at 415.
53. Id.
54. This conclusion is significant because generally injunctions are best understood as simply
avoiding the costs of post-harm adjudication. In most cases, damages are sufficient for deterrence pur-
poses and to supply needed insurance, but the expense of determining liability and damages justifies
seizing the opportunity, should it arise, to preempt the risk before actualized harm occurs.
55. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
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award of punitive damages to punishment and deterrence ends and explic-
itly denies plaintiffs any "right" or compensatory interest in such
recovery.56
Under Monumental, the test and ultimate bound for mandatory class
action is that the monetary relief must be incidental, meaning that it is "ca-
pable of computation by means of objective standards. '57 Group cohesion
is thus not lost merely because of differences, however marked and widely
varying, in the damages sought by each class member. Indeed, the court
found no impediment to certification even though damage calculation and
distribution might entail working up thousands of "restitution grids ... to
account for the myriad of policy variations," dismissing the burden with the
comment that "the monetary predominance test does not contain a sweat-
of-the brow exception. '58 Rather, the limit is reached when individualized
determinations entail the gathering and evaluation of "subjective evi-
dence." Cohesion is subverted and opt-out required by claims for compen-
satory damages that import "in any significant way . . . intangible,
subjective differences of each class member's circumstances.
' 59
The "cohesive group interest" approach as elaborated in Monumental
has important implications for the use of mandatory class action in mass
production cases. Mass production, as we have shown, entails collective
interests of particular groups and of society overall in the provision of life-
sustaining goods and law enforcement. The cohesive group interest in
these cases would qualify under the pragmatic test for Rule 23 mandatory
collectivization as outlined by the Fifth Circuit. Indeed, in a recent deci-
sion, the court indicated just such an application of this test in summarily
sustaining the district court's convening of a mandatory class under Rule
23(b)(1)(A).6 ° The class, comprised of thousands of small loan debtors,
charged the defendant with marketing the loans by deception and over-
reaching, and sought punitive and restitutory damages, as well as an injunc-
tion aimed at stopping, reforming, and undoing defendant's allegedly
unlawful business practices. While the district court did not mention "mass
production," the collective nature of the interest involved appeared to ani-
mate the decision. In examining the potential for separate actions seeking
injunctions and punitive damages to generate judgments imposing inconsis-
tent and contradictory standards of behavior on the defendant, the court
emphasized the uniformity of the lender's policies and practices. Thus, as
the court concluded, "[t]his controversy squarely falls under Rule
56. See McGowan v. Estate of Wright, 524 So.2d 308, 310 (Miss. 1988); see also Wesson v. United
States, 48 F.3d 894, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1995) (examining nature of punitive damages under Mississippi
law). This prescription of purpose and plaintiff's interest was recently codified in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-
1-65(4). Monumental noted however that punitive damages may sometimes turn on "subjective differ-
ences of each plaintiff's circumstances," as in the Title VII case before the court in Allison. See Monu-
mental, 265 F.3d at 416.
57. Id. at 416.
58. Id. at 419.
59. Id.
60. Smith v. Tower Loan of Mississippi Inc., No. 03-60339, 2004 WL 507572 (5th Cir. March 16,
2004).
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23(b)(1)(A) . . . [as the 'thrust' of plaintiffs'] action is for equitable relief
coupled with a demand for punitive damages flowing from a requested ju-
dicial condemnation of [Defendant's] uniform way of doing business. '"61
B. Rule 23(b)(3) Opt-Out Class Action
Rule 23(b)(3) provides the "catch all" for cases that fail to qualify for
mandatory collectivization under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). Whether or
not the expansive authorization we discern in Fifth Circuit decisions for
mandatory class action proves out, Rule 23(b)(3) will undoubtedly deter-
mine the question of collectivization for many cases. At a minimum, Rule
23(b)(3) will govern those cases the Fifth Circuit expressly excluded from
the purview of mandatory collectivization-namely, mass production cases
presenting claims for compensatory damages based on significantly varying
"intangible, subjective differences."
Under Rule 23(b)(3), these types of cases are fated not only to be
burdened with opt-out requirements that undermine law enforcement effi-
cacy, but also with the high probability that they will either be decertified
or denied certification in the first place, thus relegating them to the process
of separate adjudication. Both outcomes are justified on a basic presump-
tion that the claims typically involved in these cases are economically via-
ble as solo suits and many, if not most, plaintiffs possessing such claims
would prefer to go it alone. In dictating rejection or imposition of opt-out
requirements on certification, Rule 23(b)(3), according to the standard
view, serves this individualistic preference, while sacrificing little if any
benefit from class action treatment. Indeed, conventional wisdom has it
that Rule 23(b)(3) enables courts to avoid, or at least minimize, the man-
agement burdens and conflicts of interest that collective litigation of such
claims entails.
Having argued that the law enforcement benefits of collective action
always exceed those from all claims being prosecuted in separate actions
(even if the actions are brought in fractionated groups), we confine our
discussion here to the presumption and benefits that are invoked to sup-
port the limited use and opt-out requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tions. After showing that the presumption lacks reality, we conclude that
Rule 23(b)(3) provides no individualistic benefits, nor does it serve any
instrumental needs. Whatever role the chance to "go it alone" might play
can be fully accommodated by our proposed decoupling structure without
any sacrifice of the deterrence value provided by mandatory collectiviza-
tion. In the final analysis, Rule 23(b)(3) is not merely a benign appendage
or relic; rather, its narrow authorization for class action treatment and opt-
out requirements actually make matters much worse for everyone and the
system of civil liability overall.
61. Smith v. Tower Loan of Mississippi Inc., No. CIV.A. 1:98CV212BrR, 2004 WL 507572 (S.D.
Miss. March 27, 2003), affd, No. 03-60339, 2004 WL 507572 (5th Cir. March 16, 2004) .
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1. Presumption of Economic Viability and Preference for Solo Suit
The unreality of the supposition that claims seeking very high damages
are economically viable for solo suit has already been discussed. Claims for
damages, of course, determine neither the proof nor the profit of litigation.
The absurdity of the presumption that any attorney, let alone any plaintiff,
would undertake solo litigation of a mass production claim becomes clear
once the meaningless dollar amount at stake is put aside for a more realis-
tic evaluation. Generally, mass production claims are exceedingly risky
and costly to prosecute. Significantly, establishing liability requires each
plaintiff, assisted by a cadre of expensive experts, to present evidence and
arguments on a compound of complex questions that implicate disputes
over matters of social and natural science, the evolution and current pos-
ture of relevant technology, business organization and finance, and an ar-
ray of interrelated legal, institutional, and social policies. Moreover, the
circumstances of each plaintiff have no relevance in assessing the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's conduct (process, product, or service). Liability
is always determined on a class-wide basis, mostly on the basis of statistics,
regardless of whether the suit is structured as a class or separate action.
The same compelling empirical evidence belies both prongs of the pre-
sumption: that solo suit is economically viable and that plaintiffs prefer
such a method of adjudication. By all accounts, no one litigates a mass
production case alone. These claims are prosecuted either as part of actual
or anticipated aggregate actions (often quite large) or by free-riding on
other plaintiffs' work product, or both. While solo suit is touted for ena-
bling each plaintiff to have a "day in court" and control over his or her
attorney and case, the opposite is true. The cost of solo suit would effec-
tively price virtually all plaintiffs out of court and would increase (if that
were possible) the exceedingly high rate of triable claims settling before
trial.62 Furthermore, going solo generally does not enhance the ability of a
plaintiff to evaluate and manage his or her attorney's handling of a case.
Indeed, because plaintiffs bear greater costs and pressures in solo litigation
relative to class action, they would be more likely to cede control over the
case to their attorneys.
2. Individualistic Benefits
The restricted scope and opt-out requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are
said to promote the individualistic benefits alluded to above: plaintiffs'
preference for going solo to have one's own "day in court" and to control
one's own attorney and litigation. However, the inference fairly drawn
from the evidence presented above strongly suggests that no one actually
wants (or can afford) to sue solo. Indeed, the fact that virtually all mass
62. Even in the case of fractional aggregation, per claim litigation cost is relatively high because
preparation of the plaintiffs' case entails high financial outlays and risks required not only because of
the "class-wide" complex science, technology, economic, business organization, and distributive and
other public policy questions posed by the cost-benefit analysis required for liability, but also because
the defendant will be fully exploiting scale efficiencies in marshalling a counter case on liability.
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production litigation proceeds by en masse representation-that is, when it
is not some single claimant free-riding on some mass-produced work prod-
uct-implies that the absence of greater mandatory collectivization in the
marketplace is not for lack of demand, but rather, as previously discussed,
because of standard collective action problems and costs. Having a "day in
court" seems of interest only to academic lawyers.
Of course, denying the reality of benefits does not deny the reality of
costs. From the individualistic (as well as social) perspective, Rule 23(b)(3)
is a device for self-destruction. By denying class certification and by creat-
ing an opportunity for free-riding and deceptive practices by plaintiffs' at-
torneys, its policy and application promotes separate, as opposed to
collective, action, making everyone worse off. In the separate action pro-
cess, plaintiffs lose the benefits of scale efficiencies, thus undermining opti-
mal deterrence and insurance.
That the postulated preference for and benefits from solo suit are con-
troverted by overwhelming evidence, however, is of little moment to many
who advocate Rule 23(b)(3) on individualistic grounds. They are apt to
overlook, ignore, or, on the very rare of occasion of admitting some reality
into the picture, dismiss the costs as irrelevant. According to most critics,
the individualistic "benefits" of Rule 23(b)(3) are not really meant for
human use. Rather, they are deontological "goods"-proclaimed with high
sounding, moralistic (yet undefined) concepts of individual "fairness," "jus-
tice," "autonomy," "day in court," and the like 63-and meant therefore to
be established and enforced by the legal system even if no one actually
wants them and they make everyone worse off. 6 4 Were proponents of Rule
63. Beyond asserting that these concepts derive from or resonate with strongly felt and deeply
rooted legal traditions, advocates never offer anything approaching a precise definition of their moral
requirements. Vagueness and rhetoric thus shield these "goods" from analytic examination of the
moral requirements, let alone, from any assessment of the social cost that must be born to satisfy them.
64. Those who press the case for Rule 23(b)(3) on such grounds fail to consider that the choice
between exit and no-exit class action should, like any choice among competing designs of the legal
system, depend on their relative effects on individual welfare ex ante. As we have shown above, this
way of thinking is a prescription for making everyone worse off. Giving independent weight to a postu-
lated good like the preference for solo suit regardless of its effect in raising the sum of accident costs
depreciates the individual's expected welfare as a matter of course. It must be said that the individual-
istic preference urged on behalf of Rule 23(b)(3) represents a narrow, unworldly, and professionally
self-serving conception of how individuals might enhance their well-being through self-determination.
Aside from equating self-determination with the esoteric and rather fanciful "freedom" of an individual
of ordinary expertise and income to take control of litigation, let alone saddle it with the enormous
costs and risks of failure entailed by solo suit, the concept excludes every conflicting expression or
understanding of individual autonomy from consideration. Notably, it excludes every preference for
deterrence and insurance that is substantiated by the actual behavior people demonstrate in spending
trillions of dollars annually to prevent and hedge against serious injury. While hypothesizing that an
individual may derive value from controlling litigation and suing solo, proponents of Rule 23(b)(3) give
no weight to the mast-tying choices an individual would have made ex ante to secure the most basic
goods of mass production liability-effective deterrence and insurance of accident risk-which safe-
guard real autonomy, indeed health and life, ex post.
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23(b)(3) to account for its social costs, say by tallying the price (opportu-
nity cost) of opt-out in the quantitative, worldly terms of the resulting in-
creased chance of death, disability, and destitution, we might well hear less
pontification about the virtues of suing solo.
65
In addition to the unreality (in both material and metaphysical senses)
of the individualistic benefits from Rule 23(b)(3), the "moral" argument
for upholding the preference for solo suit (regardless of the consequences
or even with hope of someday overcoming the adverse effects) rests on an
analytically incoherent conception of the inherent legal predicate for civil
liability. The determination of civil liability is conceived essentially as an
individualized accounting of legal rights, wrongs, and remedies. Such an
accounting is premised on an a priori construct of some discrete, situation-
ally specific "right-duty" relationship. This relationship exists ex ante
(before the risk is taken or incurred) between the prospective plaintiff and
the defendant, and the relationship defines whether and to what extent
harm suffered by the former should be deemed having been "wrongfully
inflicted' by, and hence the responsibility ("fault") of, the latter. The sys-
tem on this account does and thus should 66 accord the parties a full oppor-
tunity to present particularized proof of the terms and conditions of the
individuals' ex ante relationship and to have the judgment measure out and
pronounce the exact ex post degree of wrong done and suffered thereby.
But whatever might be said about its account of legal reality in gen-
eral, the conception of an individual "right-duty" relationship amounts to
complete fantasy in mass production cases. Mass production precautions,
like its processes and goods, derive from the mass producer exploiting wel-
fare-enhancing scale efficiencies and investment opportunities by means of
cost-benefit projections and designs that define and address the at-risk
population in the aggregate (statistically and indivisibly). These decisions
cannot customize-that is, they cannot specifically reflect or affect the spe-
cific, subjective interests, preferences, and fortunes of any individual-
without destroying the welfare-enhancing benefits of mass production. In
essence, mass production liability based on "fault" (unreasonable risk- tak-
ing),67 turns on a statistical, not an individualized, standard of optimal pre-
cautions. In purportedly disaggregating precautions and particularizing the
degrees of wrong done to a given plaintiff, courts make everyone worse off
65. For example, proponents of Rule 23(b)(3) could estimate the consequences of raising the
likelihood of death among class members or of forgoing some number of hospitals or elementary
schools, in consequence of inappropriate levels of deterrence and insurance.
66. We pass on the questions that might be put to this type of argument, in particular, regarding
what actually "is" and why and how whatever "is" can be automatically equated with what "should" or
ought to be.
67. We assume that the conception of "wrong" incorporates at minimum some notion of "fault"
(negligence) implying liability grounded on "unreasonable" risk, not simply causing risk and harm
(strict liability). Ex ante, no one would rationally choose a system that countenanced unreasonable risk
taking, but everyone would rationally approve a system that permitted, indeed, encouraged reasonable
risk taking, provided that it also supplied optimal insurance.
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ex ante. 68 Thus, to decide the proper or reasonable level of precautions,
the prospective defendant (for simplicity we ignore the prospective plain-
tiffs' contributions to precautions) necessarily aggregates the costs and ben-
efits all possible accident scenarios and all possible marginal investments in
precautions. If appropriately motivated, the defendant will minimize the
sum of accident costs: most notably, the investment in precautions and re-
lated accident risk. The defendant will take precautions at the level that
represents the point when making the additional marginal investment in
precautions costs more than the benefit derived from avoiding the corre-
sponding unit of accident risk. The prospective defendant cannot know or
predict how and to what degree contemplated conduct will benefit or harm
anyone in the potentially affected population. The possibilities are infinite
and "knowable" only as statistically weighted probabilities. For deterrence
purposes, the only useful knowledge of those probabilities is their aggre-
gate summation. Most important, countless key components of that invest-
ment in precautions are beyond the practical power of the prospective
defendant to adjust to any given probabilistic scenario. In particular, de-
fendants cannot customize their risk-taking decisions to the individual
needs and interests of any given prospective plaintiff under any given set of
circumstances.
Our final point employs two standard tests of the validity of the type
of moral, individualistic argument advanced on behalf of Rule 23(b)(3).
First, to command acceptance as a moral imperative, any claim of an indi-
vidual "right" by one person must be exercisable on a completely indepen-
dent basis. That is, it must be exercisable without inflicting harm or
appropriating benefit from another. Second, the moral imperative of any
claimed "right" depends on its generalizability-its capacity for being fully
and equally available to everyone similarly situated. By these basic tests,
the individualistic norm attributed to Rule 23(b)(3) is morally
condemnable.
Focusing, for example, on the claimed "right" to opt-out (or of self-
exclusion from collective action) and sue solo, these tests require that the
claimed "right" of one person to exit or remain in the class cannot come at
68. This point, that mass-production decisions about precautions (like every other dimension of
the undertaking) are probabilistically and indivisibly unitary, is not dependent on transaction costs or
imperfect information. It is important to realize that the ex ante choice in favor of mass-production
precautions is not a creature of market defects. Rather, that choice stems directly from the premise that
each individual desires maximum expected welfare in a world of scarce resources and uncertainty about
his or her accident fate and prospects in the chosen legal system. The preference for mass production
holds even if we assume that individuals in that world could costlessly make market arrangements with
perfect information about all possible accident risks and related levels of precautions. Maximizing indi-
vidual expected welfare is the priority of each person behind the veil of ignorance, no one would ration-
ally prefers a legal system that mandated individually bargained, customized arrangements in lieu of the
opportunity for scale-efficiency gains from standardized, averaged mass-production arrangements. Con-
sequently, a decision-maker's attempt to disaggregate the synergistically related statistical average esti-
mates of accident risk and optimal precautions is not just an intellectually incoherent exercise and a
waste of system resources. It also undermines the fundamental social objective of minimizing the sum
of accident costs because brute disaggregation threatens to destroy, to everyone's detriment, the stan-
dardized means of mass production.
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the expense of any other class member and that this "right" is fully and
equally exercisable by all class members. However, these conditions can-
not hold. Opt-out by any single class member undermines law enforce-
ment, decreasing both the deterrence and insurance value of the litigation
for everyone else. Moreover, given the possibility of unraveling, no class
member can gain the benefits of opt-out unless all other potential class
members are barred from opting-out too (or refusing to join the collective).
For purposes of applying the test of independence, we assume that every-
one in the class harbors some preference to sue solo and would trade some
deterrence benefit-that is, would bear some increased chance of being
harmed-for the opportunity to exit the class. It is further assumed that
this preference is continuously distributed in varying degree across the
class, so that at least one class member will assess the marginal loss of de-
terrence and insurance value from exit as more than offset by the benefit
from suing solo. Under these realistic conditions, as we have shown, the
test of independence can never be satisfied in a mass production risk case.
Although a class member who values the marginal loss of deterrence and
insurance less than the marginal gain from solo suit and therefore would
elect to opt-out, the exercise of that prerogative cannot occur except at the
expense, by lowering the deterrence and insurance value from the litiga-
tion, for everyone else.6 9 Indeed, the first to exit gets an an "unequal" or
"unfair" jump on the others, including those who might value solo suit.
The law enforcement power generated by scale efficiencies implies that the
deterrence and insurance loss he or she inflicts on all potential class mem-
bers will be greater than the loss the next person would inflict on others,
and so on, with aggregate and resulting individual loss continuously de-
creasing (at a diminishing marginal rate).
The diminishing marginal rate of lost deterrence value from each suc-
ceeding opt-out also explains why a claim of "right" to opt-out cannot be
exercised unless conditioned on no one else having the same freedom of
choice. Here again we assume continuously varying preferences for solo
69. In theory, requiring anyone who exits to "make the class whole" can rectify the harm done.
Presumably, the court might assess an exit fee paid over to class counsel. That fee would be calculated
as the differenc between the optimal investment the class member will make in prosecuting his or her
claim solo and the marginal litigation investment class counsel would have made had the class member
not exited. While the class members' surplus welfare from exit should exceed the welfare loss from
paying the fee, the practical difficulties of calculating the fee and the class member's (or more realisti-
cally, his or her non-class counsel's) willingness to pay it are open questions. Ignoring the overwhelm-
ing evidence that people prefer to avoid unreasonable risk rather than to incur it for the chance of suing
solo, it can be posited that insistence by many class members on remaining in the class for its law
enforcement benefits inflicts harm on the person who prefers a solo suit. The remedy again is either for
the class member to pay a fee to exit or for the class to pay the member preferring opt-out for the loss
of "autonomy" from being denied exit. Again, there would be considerable practical problems of calcu-
lation and identification of welfare losses from being denied opt-out. The simple solution is to adopt a
variation of our proposed decoupling structure that would-albeit at the sacrifice of the insurance value
of mass production law enforcement-allow "opt-out" at the second, damage-distribution stage for
class members to seek recoveries based on the litigation value of their claims. See discussion infra, Part
II.B.3.b.
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suit (though we could assume equal preferences without affecting our con-
clusion). The point to note is that when one person finds marginal benefit
from solo suit exceeds marginal loss of deterrence and thus opts-out, the
diminishing rate of that loss will prompt another, who would not have
stepped out first, to now recognize net benefit from going it alone and so
on. In theory, the unraveling would continue to complete disintegration of
the collective.7" It should be noted that unraveling-assuming it oc-
curred-would not necessarily signify a preference for a "day in court"
over proceeding by aggregate means. The exit of succeeding claims would
at base express nothing more than the fact that the preceding or prospec-
tive exit of others has so far diminished the marginal benefits from collec-
tive litigation as to make it worthwhile to opt-out for the marginal
"autonomy" gain. For those in the collective, the prospect of its continuous
unraveling leaves them with little (and ultimately nothing) left to lose by
exiting. Thus, even if one person ranked marginal plaintiff "autonomy"
over marginal optimal deterrence, it is doubtful that the person would rank
the marginal benefit of solo suit over the aggregate loss of deterrence from
unraveling of the class action. In other words, no one would rationally
choose to opt-out for a separate action unless everyone else were forbid-
den from exercising the same freedom of choice.71
3. Instrumental Benefits
The prevailing rationales restricting certification and requiring opt-out
under Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are instrumental. In contrast to a deonto-
logical conception of opt-out as an intrinsic good (regardless of its effects
on individual welfare), the instrumental justification draws on analytical
and empirical appraisals of the benefits of giving free rein to the preference
for suing solo. In effect, proponents of Rule 23(b)(3) believe opt-out
serves as a market device that enables class members to maximize claim-
related wealth by choosing between competing modes of adjudication, class
and separate action. Thus, Rule 23 now encourages courts to provide a
second opportunity for opt-out at class settlement. As the U.S. Judicial
Conference explained, this second opt-out opportunity affords class mem-
bers a better-informed basis for comparing their respective anticipated re-
covery from, and in the absence of, class action. In addition, providing
class members this market choice is also designed as a means of checking
class counsel from selling out all or some sub-group of class members.
In addressing the proffered instrumental benefits-in particular the in-
formational benefits-of this market device, we focus on the utility of opt-
70. The focus on deterrence is appropriate because the unraveling effect will not make the first
to opt-out any worse off from an insurance point of view than he or she will be upon exiting. To opt-
out, the individual logically prefers solo suit to some degree of greater deterrence and insurance from
collective action. Presumably, given the overwhelming evidence that everyone is risk averse, the exiting
class member has other, collateral sources of insurance to make up for the coverage shortfall.
71. The expectation of incurring harm when others do the same leads individuals to create or
maintain mast-tying arrangements by means of constitutions, contracts, and family, religious, and other
close-knit organizations.
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out and proceed on two important assumptions. First, we adopt the stan-
dard definition of opt-out as encompassing all questions, common as well
as non-common, that relate to liability, damages, and any ancillary matters,
such as personal jurisdiction. Second, we assume that civil liability aims to
foster wealth maximization by assuring plaintiffs the opportunity to recover
the expected value of their individual claims regardless of whether they
proceed by class or separate action. In other words, the aim is not to foster
welfare maximization by assuring plaintiffs effective insurance coverage in
the event of suffering major loss. We examine two uses of opt-out below:
first to check class counsel self-dealing, and second to overcome bargaining
breakdowns in the negotiation of class settlements.
Our conclusion on the first use is that information costs will generally
preclude the market choice between class and separate action from achiev-
ing effective results in checking self-dealing by class counsel. Moreover, we
show that this market mechanism is part of the problem rather than part of
the solution.7" Regarding bargaining breakdowns, we offer a fully effec-
tive decoupling solution in place of opt-out. Our solution serves the prior-
ity for optimal deterrence, while, consistent with the assumption stated
above, carrying out the mandated wealth-maximizing function.
a. Check on Class Counsel Self-Dealing
We focus first on the problem of monitoring and motivating class
counsel to assure that the class claim is effectively prosecuted.73 The rea-
son opt-out is unlikely to solve this problem arises from the fact that opt-
out itself undermines class counsel's incentive to make the optimal invest-
ment in prosecuting the class claim. Class counsel's investment is driven by
the expectation of receiving a certain return, that is, the appropriate share
of the total expected recovery of the class claim. Once that return falls
below that level, class counsel no longer has an incentive to invest opti-
mally. Class members opting out singly or in groups will lack just such an
optimal return that would drive the investment needed to evaluate class
counsel's actual investment against the optimal investment he or she should
have made.
Opt-out is considered most useful at the point of class settlement, and
it is thought to be especially (if not exclusively) effective at protecting so-
called "futures"-those individuals that have not yet sustained actualized
harm-from having their claims devalued by self-dealing class counsel.
The very fact that a large number of futures opt to exit or remain in the
class is said to provide an important signal for courts to review the settle-
ment. However, the signal's reliability is compromised, as noted above, by
72. We defer discussion of our proposed solution for "sweetheart" and "blackmail" class settle-
ments. See infra at III.D.
73. Included is the hypothesized case of class counsel acquiescing in or promoting inter-class
transfers, shifting wealth from high-value claims to low-value claims. See Judith Resnick, Dennis E.
Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and
Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296 (1996). The existence of the supposed problem is based on rumor; it has
never been substantiated by any informed, careful study.
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being based on insufficiently informed class members (and their lawyers)
and possibly skewed by free-riding motives and deception by non-class
counsel. Moreover, opt-out is not likely to provide a useful signal even
when neither of these distorting factors is involved. It would provide no
meaningful indication of whether class settlement appropriately estimates
and allocates the aggregate expected value of several major variables, in-
cluding the number and distribution of future claims, changes in science or
other circumstances, and other gambles. An appropriately motivated class
settlement offer reflects the weighted average of these variables, dis-
counted by the probability of a pro-plaintiff development resulting in opt-
out and commensurately higher-average settlements in the standard mar-
ket process. Thus, in the event of a pro-plaintiff change in circumstances,
class members will exit the class settlement in large numbers regardless of
how well-motivated, calculated, and allocated its terms are. There is also
the possibility of false negatives. Depending on how steeply claim values
drop, class members may remain in the class settlement even if its fixed
offer is tainted by class counsel's self-dealing. Class members are likely to
remain in the class as long as the cost of exit and ensuing litigation exceeds
the amount misappropriated by class counsel.
This unreliable check against class counsel perfidy comes at a high
price; in particular, opt-out entails two types of cost: law enforcement and
collective action. Law enforcement cost refers primarily to information
problems incurred in the appropriate use of opt-out to police class coun-
sel's representation. In particular (assuming the prevailing rule that re-
stricts each dissident class member to individually prosecuting his or her
claim and not as-or through-a "class representative" of dissident, absen-
tee class members), recruitment of opt-outs will involve considerable ex-
pense for dissident counsel and the court to communicate the necessarily
complex information to class members. Collective action costs primarily
relate to the adverse effects on deterrence from the opportunity created by
opt-out for strategically motivated exit: specifically, as discussed above,
class members being deceived by fee-seeking attorneys or joining with
those attorneys to profit from free-riding.
Lastly, opt-out is part of the problem. As noted, it fosters free-riding
and deceptive practices by non-class counsel. Furthermore, opt-out at class
settlement provides class and "associated" counsel with the opportunity to
charge duplicative fees-one fee in connection with settling the class action
and the second fee for representing opt-outs. It will also be costly for
courts to allocate fees at the time of class settlement and over time in such
a way as to prevent this abuse. And finally, defendant and class counsel
(together with "associated" counsel") can use opt-out following court ap-
proval of class settlement as the vehicle for carrying out a sweetheart
deal.74
74. The Court in Amchem expressed concern about the appearance if not actual self-dealing
involved in class counsel settling their claim "inventories" prior to class settlement. That concern was
entirely misplaced. Any deviation of the price for inventory settlement from that which is offered by
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b. Bargaining Breakdown
Even when class counsel performs competently and faithfully, differ-
ences of opinion may arise about the value of a particular claim in settle-
ment. Class settlements, like litigation settlements generally, rarely incur
significant difficulties in compromising claims on terms of mutual satisfac-
tion to the defendant and particular class member. Generally, the parties
prefer to average out their differences over the likely result of trial of the
non-common questions, rather than bear the costs and risks of trial to fur-
ther individualize a given class member's recovery. However, asymmetries
in information and evaluation, excessive optimism regarding trial out-
comes, and other factors affecting the parties' respective dispositions to set-
tle may result in bargaining hold-outs, and in some cases, to bargaining
breakdowns and demand for trial on the non-common questions that deter-
mine relative, individual recovery.
No matter how well-motivated class counsel's representation and the
resulting aggregate class settlement, some class members may disagree with
the individualized assessment and settlement offer of their claims. Bar-
gaining breakdowns leading to trial are rare in the standard market process
and no more likely to occur in the context of class action. However, while
individualization is unnecessary for deterrence purposes (except for indi-
vidual deterrence purposes, such as reducing payouts to account for a class
member's contributory negligence), imposing class settlement terms in dis-
regard of a class member's desire for trial on the non-common questions
might contravene the mandate for plaintiffs to maximize claim-related
wealth. This mandate can be read broadly to afford class members the
option they would have had in the standard market process of rejecting a
settlement offer and going for broke to maximize claim-related wealth.
Nevertheless, opt-out is unnecessary to satisfy this trial demand. Instead,
the court can employ the decoupled class action outlined above. During
the first stage, the court would determine aggregate liability and damages,
furthering the priority for deterrence, and depending on the outcome, the
court would conduct a second stage of litigation where individual damages
are distributed. However, instead of distributing damages according to se-
verity of harm, the court could distribute them according to the relative
strength of class members' claims on the non-common questions.
the class settlement would have raised an immediate red flag. Indeed, the district court in Amchem
examined the settlement to detect just such a differential. The Supreme Court ignored the lower
court's extensive findings of fact substantiating the judgment that no such difference existed. Yet, no
concern about self-dealing was voiced about the recent class settlement of the phen-fen litigation that
provided multiple opportunities for opt-out after approval of the class settlement. Indeed, oblivious to
the potential for abuse, the courts involved and commentators have hailed the phen-fen class settlement
as a model for the future. However, the post-settlement opportunities for opt-out provided class coun-
sel and other lawyers supporting the settlement a completely unmonitored vehicle for self-dealing. For
further critical analysis of a class settlement model exemplified by the phen-fen class settlement, see
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 831, 867 (2002).
20051
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The cost of opt-out, as discussed above, is loss of the collective, opti-
mal investment that maximizes the deterrence value of adjudicating mass
production claims. Of course, class members ex post have little or no con-
cern about that cost. However, wealth-maximizing class members are nev-
ertheless concerned about the loss of the collective optimal investment.
That investment maximizes aggregate net recovery on the common ques-
tion component of the claims and, therefore, the net recovery everyone
receives. Wealth-maximizing class members would prefer to retain collec-
tive optimal investment on the common questions, while preserving the op-
tion of trial on the non-common questions in the event that they disagree
with the individualized settlement offer.
Class members dissatisfied with proceeding through class counsel or
with their respective settlement offers in the second stage can be given the
option of hiring their own attorneys and demanding a "mini" trial on the
non-common questions against the aggregate fund established for deter-
rence purposes. To be sure, litigation of the non-common questions entails
costs and risks that will winnow down the number and level of recoveries
by class members. Many claims will simply fail by default because their
relatively low return renders them unmarketable to class counsel or other
competent attorneys. However, these results merely replicate the standard,
separate action process. Indeed, class members are better off because of
the class action scale advantages in the first stage prosecution of the com-
mon questions. Collective litigation of the common questions will increase
the average expected recovery value of class members' claims above what
they would be worth if the class member had opted out. Thus, the
decoupled mandatory class action fosters-with greater litigation effective-
ness than the conventional alternative of individualized adjudication-the
pursuit of claim-related wealth.75
75. Professor Erichson argues that courts should allow opt-out for those class members who want
"a stronger client-lawyer relationship.., and ... greater opportunity for expression through pleadings,
at trial, or otherwise." Erichson, supra note 39, at 315. However, he does not address studies showing
that lawyers rarely provide such "individualized" service in any setting. While some suggest that law-
yers are thereby neglecting their professional obligations, the more plausible explanation is that there is
little or no demand for such services at the price lawyers would charge to supply it. Indeed, there is no
compelling reason why class counsel would eschew a closer lawyer-client relationship with any class
member were he or she willing to pay for it. Moreover, Erichson fails to explain exactly what a given
claimant's individual situation might add by way of relevant information in the "pleadings, at trial, or
otherwise" regarding the common questions of law and fact that comprise the entirety of the class claim
of mass production liability. As we have noted, the nature and social value of mass production require
the unitary, collective adjudication of those questions for the class as a whole. Finally, Erichson ignores
the main thrust of his own argument that few if any claimants prefer individualized litigation relation-
ships and opportunities to the greater benefits of collective representation. Given lack of demand, it is
difficult to justify the high price of creating an opt-out process, which includes the expense for notice
and consultation with class members in addition to encouraging free riding, which undermines deter-
rence benefits of collective law enforcement. While studies indicate that on average only a small frac-
tion of class members opt-out, the cost of free riding is exacted largely by the credible threat to exit and
pirate the class action work product and class counsel's anticipatory reduction in litigation investment
and consequent costs to minimize the profit margin for freeloaders. Professor Erichson acknowledges
that he has not considered our proposal for decoupling deterrence and compensation functions of class
actions. As we have shown, decoupling these functions effectively preserves the deterrence benefits of
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III. CORE QUESTIONS
Having developed our argument for mandatory class actions and
against adoption of any class action rule that is modeled after Federal Rule
23, we now turn to several core questions bearing on the structuring, opera-
tion, and scope of collectivization. In particular, we begin our argument by
explaining that class actions should be convened automatically and imme-
diately based on the filing of the first, actualized harm claim, encompassing
all potential claims, without delay for "maturation" through pre-certifica-
tion separate actions. We then go on to argue that litigation class actions
are superior, and in all ways preferable, to settlement-only class actions.
Third, we discuss the conditions under which Mississippi should conduct
multi-state class actions. And finally, we proffer remedies for the problems
(assuming their reality) of "sweetheart" and "blackmail" class settlements.
A. Timing and Scope of Collectivization
A basic consideration for the law enforcer is when and how far to in-
tervene in overseeing a mass producer's decision about what precautions
should be taken to reduce the risk of a proposed undertaking. The course
of a mass production risk from its inception in design planning through to
final effects on some exposed population generally follows a relatively lin-
ear time-line: (i) mass producer evaluates its potential payoffs from some
range of design options, which present various combinations of social bene-
fit, risk, and precautions against accident; (ii) mass producer selects and
then implements the design option (including "do nothing") that promises
maximum payoff for the government or business enterprise; (iii) in opera-
tion, the design results in exposure of some population to systematic risk;
(iv) some number of individuals suffer actualized harm ranging from minor
to serious; (v) civil liability claim(s) for actualized harm and any continuing
risk are threatened, filed, litigated, and resolved by judgment, settlement,
or withdrawal. Intervention at any point on this time-line also affects the
relative scope of oversight. Take the extremes of earliest and latest inter-
vention. At the earliest, the law enforcer can sweep the whole process of
risk-taking-pre- and post-design selection-within the ambit of law en-
forcement for comprehensive oversight. At the latest, scrutiny may be lim-
ited to cases of actualized harm if or as they arise, and eschewing
collectivization, the court can proceed case-by-case to determine the exis-
tence of sanctionable risk or loss and levy fines or damages accordingly.
class action law enforcement by enabling collectivized adjudication of the wholly common and collec-
tive questions of liability in the first stage, while in the second stage governing damages distribution,
class members seek recovery on an individualized basis, pressing their case to the limits of economic
viability through counsel and in venues of their own choosing. To avoid being misinterpreted, we do
not recommend turning the second stage of the class action over to this form of wealth-maximizing
game, which squanders social resources that could otherwise be used to provide insurance for those
suffering catastrophic loss. The better approach, we maintain, is to distribute damages in the second
stage in accord with the social objective of providing needed insurance protections.
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Intervention can occur at one or more points on this time-line with
varying enforcement costs and expected benefits. Thus, as with the use of
any law enforcement structure and strategy, the appropriateness of timing
and corresponding scope of intervention depends on the law enforcement
payoff in terms of cost-effective risk management. For example, the earli-
est option for intervention, so-called "command and control" regulation, is
frequently employed as part of a licensing process that includes direct mon-
itoring and mandates dictating constraints on the process and substance of
the mass producer's design and other pre-implementation decisions. Such
anticipatory intervention is usually the most expensive of all law enforce-
ment options, particularly because ferreting out activities that warrant such
heavy-duty oversight from among the welter of mass production enterprise
inevitably expends scarce resources on many "dry holes"-activities that
turn out not to present any reason for intervention. For this reason, com-
mand and control regulation is used sparingly and usually to target activi-
ties likely to yield a relatively high enforcement payoff, such as where
inadequate precautions, say in the construction or operation of a nuclear
power plant, could result in catastrophic loss or where financial instability
or management turnover may dilute the deterrent effects from threatened
fines or damages for actualized harm.
There is no categorical, let alone conceptual, bar to courts exercising
otherwise appropriate "command and control" jurisdiction through, for ex-
ample, a private or public nuisance suit for injunctive relief. However,
given the existence of other law enforcement agencies with greater powers
of investigation and supervision as well as expertise and resources, it makes
sense for courts, limited on all counts, to intervene at more remote points
in time when general jurisdiction can be productively exercised.
However, there is a point of negative marginal return from such a
strategy, and the courts seem to have gone well past that point in deploying
civil liability predominantly on a case-by-case basis for claims of actualized
harm. While this approach may prove effective in managing the risks of
driving cars, though this supposition is far from obvious, making actualized
harm a prerequisite for civil liability and imposing sanctions on a case-by-
case basis is not only wasteful but positively counterproductive in manag-
ing risks of mass production.
The following explains why and how courts should advance interven-
tion relative to the standard case-by-case mode of actualized harm adjudi-
cation. In sum, courts should convene mandatory class actions that
encompass not only the totality of actualized harm but also the entire out-
standing risk thereof (inclusive of psychological and mitigatory aspects).
We develop the case for mandatory class action treatment, focusing on
"mass exposure cases," litigations involving "latent" risk, such as a pharma-
ceutical with a delayed adverse side effect, or serial risks exemplified by the
typical products liability case. We then examine two options for modulat-
ing the timing and scope of the mass exposure class action. In particular,
we look at two alternatives for triggering class action intervention-risk
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alone or first-filed claim of actualized harm. Finally, we address arguments
for delaying class action treatment to allow for "maturation" of claims
through separate action litigation.
1. The Need for Anticipatory, Risk-Based, Intervention by Class Action
For cases in which all members of the class presently suffer from actu-
alized harm, the law enforcement benefits of immediate and complete col-
lectivization are evident from the argument developed throughout this
article. Proceeding claim-by-claim or in any combination of claims short of
full collectivization sacrifices scale efficiencies otherwise available to en-
hance the productivity of judicial as well as plaintiff law enforcement ef-
forts. Mandatory class action enables plaintiffs and courts to exploit in full
measure available scale efficiencies and thus corrects the systemic bias that
would otherwise threaten to distort deterrence and insurance results of civil
liability.
Of particular interest here is the case that involves latent or serial risk
resulting in the incidence of actualized harm over time among some frac-
tion of those exposed. Justification for collectivization of these "mass ex-
posure" cases requires little extension of the general argument. Regardless
of the enforcer-judicial, administrative, or executive-hastening interven-
tion can be advantageous by avoiding various unnecessary costs associated
with uncertainty resulting from protracted litigation. These savings inure
to the benefit of the actual and potential litigants and beyond them to
larger populations of "third parties," including consumers, workers, and in-
sureds. A quick resolution of liability also removes the cloud of uncer-
tainty associated with litigation that burdens defendants in various ways,
including magnifying deterrence to excess against businesses in competitive
markets, diverting key personnel and needed resources from productive
enterprises, undermining the business' reputation, related financial posi-
tions, customer trust and goodwill, and hampering the business' competi-
tion for labor, material, and capital.
However, the principal reason to accelerate intervention is to assure
that adjudicative outcomes are shaped by symmetrical opportunities for the
court, plaintiffs, and defendants to exploit scale efficiencies. The need to
correct systemic bias implies that the class action must encompass the total-
ity not only of actualized harm, but also of legally cognizable risk. In par-
ticular, class action must encompass increased risk (assessing damages
equal to the sanctionable harm times the probability of such harm occur-
ring); psychological harm (e.g. "fear of cancer"); and mitigation (e.g. asbes-
tos removal). In short, effective law enforcement in mass exposure cases
requires collectivization of all risk-based as well as actualized harm claims.
Consistent with the priority for deterrence, the principle gain from ad-
vancing intervention is to assure that mass producers internalize and ac-
count for the total cost of sanctionable harm in their pre-decision, risk-
precaution calculus. However, structuring the mandatory class action to
encompass risk-based claims may also prove useful in distributing damages.
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As previously noted in connection with development of the decoupled
model of mandatory class action, distribution of damages generally serves
to enhance individual welfare when confined and structured by four pur-
poses: providing needed insurance; improving the well-being of risk-averse
individuals (everyone); rewarding and reimbursing the bearing of litigation
cost; and avoiding distortion of consumption and investment choices. The
mass exposure class action proves useful not only, as we have shown, to
provide "insurance fund" coverage based on relative severity of loss rather
than on relative litigation value of a claim, but it can also provide risk-
averse class members who have adequate insurance from collateral sources
with an immediate cash payment equal to the expected value of their con-
tingent claim. Regardless of risk aversion and insurance considerations,
such an expected value payout avoids distortions of consumption and in-
vestment incentives that might arise, were individuals threatened with in-
curring sanctionable loss without expectation of repayment.76 Moreover,
the mass exposure class action reduces class members' bearing of litigation
costs and therefore their demand for reward and reimbursement.
2. Options for Triggering Collectivization
We now examine two trigger options: risk alone or first-filed claim of
actualized harm.
a. Risk-Triggered Collectivization
Intervention based on the incidence of risk alone-before the inci-
dence of any actualized harm-is a standard enforcement strategy. The
conditions warranting early imposition of sanctions relate primarily to con-
cerns about the adverse consequences of the elapse of time on deterrence
effects. Thus, triggering judicial regulatory intervention on risk alone pro-
motes optimal deterrence and insurance particularly when the amount of
sanctionable loss could be very large and the firm would likely lack suffi-
cient assets to pay the total amount. Assessing liability equivalent to the
aggregate sanctionable risk imposes damages in an amount that is at once
appropriate for deterrence purposes, but also that is usually far less than
the total loss, hence affordable by the mass producer. At the same time,
the assessed amount could supply the premium for insurance to replace
sanctionable loss incurred by those who suffer serious harm. Advancing the
day of judgment will also curtail opportunism by managers who might oth-
erwise gamble that the brunt of liability will fall on their successors many
years later. Moreover, risk-based intervention is especially useful in cases
involving evidence that can disappear, degrade, or become far more expen-
sive to acquire over time, increasing the probability of the firm escaping
liability. For example, causal indeterminacy plagues many industrial pollu-
tion cases because the lapse of time often obstructs efforts to track down
76. In addition, in many cases, class members needing more insurance to cover the defendant's
risk can use the proceeds of accelerated distribution to buy additional coverage more cheaply on the
commercial market-and often, from their own first-party insurers.
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the source of excessive effluent or to determine which of several possible
sources contributed to the actualized serious harm in question. Further-
more, as explained above, immediately converting long-term risk of diver-
gent outcomes into a determinate expected value enhances the welfare of
risk-averse parties, defendants, plaintiffs, and their respective attorneys.
b. Collectivization Triggered by First-Filed Claim of Actualized Harm
While mass exposure class action improves investment incentives, civil
liability is unlikely to rival the effectiveness of administrative regulation. A
major reason is the general divergence between "social" and "party"
stakes. Namely, "private" and "public" motives for suit align in purpose
and commitment of resources only by happenstance.77 In addition, courts
lack the resources and comprehensive perspective typically available to ad-
ministrative agencies. Moreover, as noted above, there is a corresponding
divergence in litigation investment affecting law enforcement outcomes.
Government agents are more likely to have better access, information, and
expertise in detecting and evaluating sanctionable risk-taking before any
incidence of actualized harm.
Given these constraints, convening the mass exposure class action
upon the filing of the first actualized harm claim may well serve law en-
forcement ends best in the absence of special circumstances warranting ad-
vancing intervention to the risk-only stage. The key benefit of using this
trigger is that it not only enables collectivization of all contemporary and
ensuing actualized harm and risk claims-contemporary and ensuing, as
well as pre-existing risk-but, it also entails no greater cost and scope of
adjudication than courts normally incur in the standard separate action
process. Convening a mass exposure class action based on the first-filed
actualized harm claim presents, as noted at the outset, determination of
precisely the same questions of aggregate risk-taking, benefit, and savings
from precautions on the margin that a court must decide in any event to
resolve the actualized harm claim in the standard separate action process.
The decoupled class action structure provides courts flexibility in organiz-
ing the method and timing of any distribution of aggregate damages.
3. No Need to "Mature" Claims Through Separate Action Process
Collectivization of mass production claims usually presents a number
of material, sharply contested questions of law and fact (and law-fact appli-
cations) that involve a compound of complex, costly to resolve, issues of
natural and social science, technology, business organization and finance,
insurance, and matters of distributive and other public policy. At the outset
77. For a complete discussion of the divergence between "private" and "public" motives for suit,
see Steven Shavell, Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal
System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). Private litigants will only be motivated to bring suit when their
potential recoveries exceed their litigation costs. However, certain socially desirable cases-that is,
cases where a defendant has imposed an unreasonable risk on a population-will not be brought be-
cause the cost of suit is too high.
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of litigation, the outcome of these disputes is uncertain. The nature of the
proceedings, class action or separate action, is totally irrelevant to the na-
ture of the questions regarding either their content or their chance of being
resolved one way or another at trial. Nevertheless, uncertainty about the
resolution of science and certain other questions posed by mass production
cases has led a number of courts and commentators to conclude that con-
vening a class action should be delayed for some period to litigate the
claims in the separate action process to reveal their "contours," if not their
merit.78
This "maturation" prerequisite is costly and nebulous, for it entails
multiple, separate action trials held over many years simply to decide
whether the case should be tried by class action. Moreover, it affords no
basis for a court, even after expending substantial resources, to say that the
desired contours have or have not been adequately determined. Expense
and capriciousness is not the least of the problems with the maturation
requirement. If the object is not really to avoid permanently confronting
the class action question, then sending the parties on the expensive and
indeterminate quest must find justification in the sought-after information.
However, whatever value there is to this information, seeking it through
separate action "maturation" is unnecessary. Indeed, resorting to that pro-
cess is positively antithetical to law enforcement objectives.
Two general reasons are given by maturation proponents for wanting
more definite knowledge of the "contours" of the claim: the need to estab-
lish "predominance" of common issues and the desire to temper the vari-
ance of potential outcomes from class trial. For some courts and
commentators, the contours in question relate to the Rule 23(b)(3) require-
ment that common questions predominate over non-common questions.
However, determining predominance of common questions serves no pur-
pose in the mandatory class action regime. As we have shown, mandatory
collectivization enhances adjudicative effectiveness in terms of the social
objective for civil liability, most notably by affording the class and the court
the opportunity to exploit the scale efficiencies that the defendant always
possesses. To be sure, litigation typically clarifies the scope and substance
of the dispute, but no one should trust the results of the presently biased
process for adjudicating separate actions.7 9 Mandatory collectivization
78. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rhorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Francis E.
McGovern, Symposium: National Mass Tort Conference: An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1821 (1995).
79. Although some commentators believe that the separate action process may actually help
plaintiffs by allowing them to "gain an advantage by pushing stronger cases to trial first," Erichson,
supra note 39, at 9, we believe this conclusion to be false. In fact, just the opposite would likely occur.
As Prof. Silver points out, "[b]y settling good cases for large amounts and defending bad ones aggres-
sively, defendants can manipulate the trial record to their advantage and drive down settlement values
in pending cases." Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1378-79 (2003). Of course, there is no necessary relationship between tactical
partisan advantage and promoting the social objectives of the legal system. The whole point of collec-
tivized law enforcement is not to change the balance of tactical litigation advantage. The aim of
mandatory class action, as we have argued, is to enable the law to improve the well-being of everyone
[VOL. 24:153
CLASS ACTIONS: TO BE OR NOT TO (B)(3)?
yields the needed information far more cost-effectively and reliably. The
decoupling structure we propose also obviates concern about claim-specific
variables giving rise to potentially debilitating intra-class conflicts. Poten-
tial conflicts among class members are eliminated if distribution of dam-
ages in the second stage of the class action accords with insurance theory
and payouts are based on severity of loss and need. In fact, as we demon-
strated earlier, a decoupled class action can achieve deterrence priority
even if damages are distributed through claim-by-claim litigation (at the
compensation stage) to maximize individual wealth rather than welfare.
For other courts and commentators, gaining more definite knowledge
of the class claims' "contours" involves reducing uncertainty regarding
common questions not to determine predominance, but simply to temper
the variance of potential outcomes from class trial. Often spotlighted are
scientific disputes, particularly those focusing on so-called "general causa-
tion"-the causal connection between defendant's mass production activity
and the harm(s) alleged by the class. It is thought that these uncertainties
should be resolved before submitting the case for class action treatment
and that separate action litigation should be used for this purpose. Neither
prescription holds up to functional analysis. Given that advocates of matu-
ration for these purposes would have these cases decided in separate ac-
tions despite uncertainties that presumably are too great for class action to
handle, it is important to isolate and consider what supposedly relevant
distinctions render class action less suitable than separate actions for adju-
dicating mass production cases from the outset.
It might be supposed that because they stem from individual claims,
separate actions enable courts to render the science and similarly complex
questions more manageable and amenable to reliable resolution by framing
them in narrower, disaggregated terms. That supposition is false. The lia-
bility questions in mass production cases are identical regardless of adjudi-
cative format. Given the comparative lack of resources available to
plaintiffs and courts in separate actions, class action is by far the superior
mode for orderly and reliable resolution of these cases. The liability ques-
tions posed in a mass production case are entirely common, mostly statisti-
cal, and, as we have emphasized, class-wide in scope and substance. To
treat them otherwise is to threaten destruction of the social value from
by maximizing the combined goods of law enforcement and mass production. In any event, those as-
serting an advantage for separate actions not only ignore the self-destructive effects of fractional aggre-
gation, let alone going solo, but they also fail to explain why the individuals with stronger cases would
take the risk of losing just to raise the average settlement value for others with weaker cases, presuming
it would cost too much for defendants to sort out the weak ones. Furthermore, these commentators
assume without basis that class action is endemically constrained from affording the same or function-
ally equivalent social advantages that might be available in the separate action process. Thus, to the
extent exemplar cases are relevant in determining the common questions of liability, class counsel
surely would have not only the incentive, but also the collective means of employing the stronger cases
for maximum benefit at trial to enhance the overall value of the class claim. Mandatory class action
assures that claimants with stronger cases would not bear all the risk of losing the separate action while
others share the rewards of their success; rather, these cases would go to trial in solidarity with the
resources and interests of the entire class.
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mass production processes and goods that sustains the lives and livelihoods
of most people in the world. The assumed reliability of the maturation
process is also misplaced, as the results are subject to being distorted by the
systemic bias in the separate action process favoring mass production
defendants.
Similarly, it would be error to believe that separate action litigation
will hasten or necessarily coincide with developments in science. Science
usually does not march to the drumbeat of litigation, and it is least reliable
when it does. Of course, it is always possible that science could report rele-
vant information while the maturation process is continuing. Yet, the re-
port also might be received while the class action is pending, particularly
during the lengthier second stage devoted to distribution of damages.
Ultimately, there is no necessity to resolve uncertainty-scientific or
otherwise-as a condition for convening a class action. Mass production
liability is appropriately determined based on the probabilistic assessment
of aggregate sanctionable risk or loss. Indeed, this is precisely the determi-
nation that must be made in every case, class action, or separate action. It
is the fundamental question posed by any claim or defense that calls for
assessment of liability based on negligence and under virtually all rules and
applications of strict liability. Once aggregate expected risk or loss has
been determined by class action-however much that decision has been
expedited by collective action processing-the advent of new information,
regarding science or otherwise, is irrelevant to achieving the objectives of
civil liability. No adjustments should be made to the assessment of aggre-
gate expected sanctionable risk or loss that determined the mass producer's
liability. This determination already accounts for the weighted probability
of all relevant contingencies, such as subsequent scientific findings respect-
ing causation. An insurance fund judgment founded on those estimates ac-
counts for all post-judgment contingencies. As such, it fully and effectively
achieves insurance as well as deterrence ends. It can readily support distri-
bution of damages for purposes, however socially detrimental, of allowing
class members to maximize claim-related wealth, often at the expense of
others who have been severely harmed and may be in need of insurance.
Finally, maturation is favored for the benefits of multiple trials. Multi-
ple trials may supply additional information that can usefully reduce high
variance in estimates of potential outcomes from trial that might obstruct
socially appropriate settlement of mass production cases. When the parties
are far apart in the estimates of expected liability and damages, taking the
average of multiple trial outcomes can close the distance sufficiently to re-
veal common ground for compromise and settlement. Also, the divergence
of outcomes presented by a single all-or-nothing trial can pressure risk-
averse parties, plaintiffs as well as defendants, to surrender on terms that
deviate significantly from the "true" merits of the case. Affording the par-
ties an opportunity to have liability determined as the average of multiple
trial outcomes will, regardless of its exercise, relieve them from the pres-
sure to capitulate too soon or too much. But it would be a mistake to favor
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maturation on the assumption that class action implies a single class action
trial, and therefore the benefits of multiple trials are only available through
separate actions. Indeed, the most straightforward and efficacious means of
providing this option is through class action. Generally, the court need
only convene the class action and then allow the parties to conduct as many
trials as they would in the absence of class action. While the option for the
parties to conduct multiple class action trials is potentially more costly than
a single class action trial, the provision of that option will generate greater
benefits by reducing high variance in potential outcomes on liability as a
whole or any specific question, such as the scientific estimate of the causal
connection. Moreover, providing this option through class action has the
great advantage of empowering the class and court to marshal all available
scale efficiencies in performance of their law enforcement roles and
thereby eliminating the systemic bias favoring mass production defendants.
B. Litigation v. Settlement-Only Class Action
Unlike litigation class actions, settlement-only class actions do not re-
sult in class action trial should the parties fail to reach, or the court refuse
to approve, a class settlement. In the absence of settlement, the class ac-
tion dissolves, and all claims return for trial through the standard market
process of separate actions. By contrast, the litigation class action creates
an incentive for the defendant to settle class members' claims by con-
fronting it with the threat of a collectively prosecuted class trial that elimi-
nates the defendant's asymmetric scale advantages, thereby raising
settlement values above those generated in the standard market process.
This key difference makes settlement-only class actions inferior to litigation
class actions. Settlement-only class actions deny plaintiffs the opportunity
to exploit the scale efficiencies that drive optimal investment in litigating
the defendant's mass production liability. Thus, any settlement in a settle-
ment-only class action reflects claim values depressed not only by the plain-
tiffs' suboptimal investment incentive, but also by the defendant's superior
litigation power. Since elimination of mass production defendants' asym-
metric investment advantages is absolutely essential to achieving the nor-
mative goals of optimal deterrence and insurance, we believe that
Mississippi should limit class certification to mandatory litigation class
actions.
1. Limited Benefits of Settlement-Only Class Action
Contingent on the circumstances of each case, settlement-only class
action may slightly improve upon settlements in the separate action pro-
cess. To the extent that the defendant credibly commits to settling claims
only within the framework and terms of the class settlement, it could avoid
the costs of strategic bargaining the firm would confront in the standard
market process. In particular, it could thwart hold-outs in the standard
market process that demand excessive recovery or that prevent a risk
averse defendant from concluding "global" settlement to relieve itself of
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the (presumably socially inappropriate) burden of long-term, massive ex-
posure to liability, especially when it includes the prospect of open-ended
or redundant punitive damages. Indeed, the defendant is likely to pay class
members a small "bonus" representing some share of the surplus from
avoided holdout costs, particularly in the latter case. Any savings retained
by the defendant, moreover, may have the beneficial effect of lowering the
level of excessive deterrence that would otherwise obtain were hold-out
bargaining unabated.
2. Superiority of Litigation Class Action
On the other hand, settlement-only class actions offer no additional
scale efficiencies for development of the merits of plaintiffs' claims above
the scale opportunities that standard market processes provide. This type
of class action, therefore, merely reproduces the claim recovery values gen-
erated by the individualized adjudication process. This limitation arises
when a class action convened solely to effect class-wide settlement could
not satisfy prerequisites (e.g. common question predominance) for certifi-
cation for all litigation purposes, including trial as well as settlement. Fail-
ure to achieve such settlement in such a settlement-only class action-
because the parties cannot reach agreement or because they fail to obtain
judicial approval-automatically dissolves the class action and disaggre-
gates the claims, returning (or, effectively leaving) them for disposition in
the conventional separate action process. Litigation class action is opera-
tionally, and therefore functionally, distinct from settlement-only class ac-
tion because failure to achieve class-wide settlement does not result in
dissolution of the litigation. Instead, the case proceeds to trial based on
class-wide aggregation of all classable claims and with the benefit of the
corresponding optimal investment. In contrast, plaintiffs' bargaining power
in settlement-only class actions derives from whatever truncated scale effi-
ciencies and investment opportunities they can marshal through disaggre-
gated litigation in the market. Consequently, settlement-only class actions
deny plaintiffs the opportunity to exploit investment scale efficiencies opti-
mally to maximize aggregate benefit from the defendant's mass production
liability. The end result of this weak bargaining position is, at best, a settle-
ment that offers plaintiffs suboptimal deterrence and insurance.
In sum, whatever the benefits settlement-only class action may provide
relative to fractional aggregation in the separate action process can be pro-
vided by the litigation class action fully and more cost-effectively. And, as
we have shown, only through mandatory litigation class action can plain-
tiffs confront mass production defendants with the threat of a collectively
prosecuted class trial that eliminates the defendant's asymmetric scale ad-
vantages. In other words, mandatory litigation class action is the only ave-
nue for securing the normative goals of optimal deterrence and insurance,
and ultimately overall welfare-maximization.
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C. Multi-State Class Actions8"
Extension of Mississippi class action treatment to claims of non-re-
sidents arising outside Mississippi ("multi-state class action") poses a ques-
tion that is largely a matter of "should" and "how" rather than "can."
With the chief exception of possible constitutional limitations on use of
mandatory class action, resort to multi-state class actions calls for a judg-
ment of public policy. The most salient policy consideration, as we have
stressed from the beginning, is the effect of the choice-for or against or
somewhere in between-on achieving the law enforcement objectives of
civil liability. We begin by briefly noting the collective interests that not
only support mandatory collectivized adjudication of mass production
cases, but also call for employing, as far as practical, multi-state class ac-
tions. We then consider design options for conducting multi-state class ac-
tions, for financing collectivized adjudication of claims by non-resident
class members, and for satisfying constitutional conditions on the use of
mandatory, multi-state class actions.
1. Collective Interests in Mass Production and Multi-State Class Action
Mass production and its effective governance necessitate social soli-
darity to assure that the production of both "primary" goods (products and
services) and "secondary" goods (deterrence and insurance) maximizes so-
cial welfare by fully exploiting all available scale efficiencies. This collec-
tivity or unity of interest has several components. Two have been
repeatedly relied upon to support our argument for mandatory class action:
(1) securing the benefits from mass production processes and goods and (2)
managing mass production activity effectively by reducing and insuring risk
to socially appropriate levels. The third, specifically related to the present
question, concerns the unitary, indivisible law enforcement interest among
states subject to boundary-crossing (inter-state or multi-state) mass produc-
tion risk.
a. Securing Mass Production Benefits
The social benefit of mass production is wholly contingent on every-
one being committed to bear its costs. These costs include not only the
price of production, but also the tradeoff necessitated by a world of scarce
80. Notwithstanding passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, our argument for nation-
wide class certification is still important to Mississippi, since under the terms of the Act federal courts
do not have jurisdiction to hear a case in which the "primary defendants" and two-thirds of the plain-
tiffs are Mississippians, no matter what the aggregate amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B)
("A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2) . . . over a class action in
which ... two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed."). Furthermore,
even if only "small" class actions are left in state court, our arguments remain the same: just as a
defendant should not be able to skirt full liability by using plaintiffs' numbers against them, defendants
should not be able to avoid full liability because the harm is widely and thinly dispersed geographically.
And finally, our proposal for certifying multi-state class action is probably even more effective on a
national level than a state level, although we believe that states should nonetheless certify nationwide
classes for the reasons enumerated below.
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resources. This tradeoff compels sacrificing some personal preferences to a
collective, average preference. The individual accepts the exchange be-
cause it promises greater well-being. For the vast majority of people, pre-
serving the collective goods of mass production generally implicates their
most vital interests, including prospects for earning a livelihood, opportuni-
ties for self-determination and self-fulfillment, freedom from stultifying
fear of grave injury and being left without means to obtain medical and
other necessities, and ultimately, the chance for survival.
If the collective goods of mass production are to be preserved, the
legal system must not allow individuals to opt-out of this commitment.
Courts, however, are under constant pressure to relent in determining lia-
bility based on aggregate average assessment of reasonableness. The focus,
it is often said, should be on the plight of the individual plaintiff, who after
all has usually suffered some severe harm that everyone else in the court-
room dearly hopes to avoid. For example, the driver of a compact car who
is injured in a collision with a full-sized sedan might sue the compact car
manufacturer, alleging the car's standardized small size was a defective de-
sign, not for the average uses and interests of the projected consumer class,
but rather for plaintiff's individual uses and interests. Yet, if courts were to
deem such after-the-fact demands for customization sufficient for civil lia-
bility and damages, they would preempt mass producers from exploiting
scale efficiencies, making everyone worse off, including the plaintiff at the
earlier point in time when he or she purchased the car for anticipated bene-
fits over and above the risks.
b. Effective Management of Mass Production Risk
Similar to allowing individuals to opt-out of the joint venture of mass-
producing beneficial goods, rejecting mandatory class action would jeop-
ardize the social benefits from effective reduction and insurance of mass
production risks. Opt-out from class action undermines everyone's inter-
ests in protection from unreasonable risk and from being severely harmed
with nowhere to turn for needed insurance benefits. Despite being charac-
terized as an expression of autonomous individual choice, opt-out to sue
"solo" against a mass producer actually deprives everyone else of having an
equivalent choice, not in mere form but rather in substance. As with any
Hobbesian each-against-all conception of "fairness" or "liberty," moral
generalization is impossible; no one can choose to sue alone, or exercise
any other individual prerogative, without necessarily devaluing another's
choice to do the same.
This consequence is unavoidable in the present context because of the
defendant's natural, "de facto" class action scale efficiencies in mass pro-
duction cases. This condition arises only when the mass producer confronts
or contemplates more than one separate action being filed against it. Thus,
the mass production defendant has no scale advantage if only one suit were
filed; it is the filing of a second solo suit or the prospect of such filing that
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affords the defendant superior litigation power over both plaintiffs. In-
deed, if numerous injured individuals all sued separately-realizing the
"ideal" of everyone having a "day in court"-they would, precisely because
of their large number, recover less at trial or in settlement than they would
have if fewer of them had sued. In effect, the defendant is able to use the
plaintiffs' numerosity against them, so that the value of their claims is re-
duced for no reason other than the fact that they sue in large numbers.
This paradoxical negation of the notion of an "autonomous" choice to sue
"solo" is an arbitrary and, from the standpoint of legal policy, undesirable
result.
c. Inter-State Unity of Interest
In addition to the duality of collective interests in gaining benefit from
mass production that law enforcement maximizes by eliminating all reason-
ably avoidable risk and insuring the balance, there is a further unity that
relates to multi-state cases involving business enterprise. The general view
of state regulation (through civil liability) of mass producer conduct is that
all material effects are equivalent regardless of whether the conduct gener-
ates a risk wholly within the state or across boundaries in multiple states.
In fact, regulatory effects of a state's law are significantly different when
the risk spreads inter-state from those when the risk is confined to one
state.
In the latter, the state may exert direct, singular law enforcement au-
thority over the mass producer. Thus, the state may use civil liability to
induce or even command the firm to take independent, state-specific pre-
cautions and, if necessary, prepare to provide insurance against reasonably
unavoidable risk. In functional terms, the state may be said to exercise
"sovereign" power in the intra-state case.
In the multi-state case, however, a given state's authority is neither
"sovereign" in this sense, nor, given the object of civil liability, should it be
exercised as such. Again, the nature of mass production creates a paradox
of numbers. Essentially, operating in the environment of multiple varying
laws, the mass producer regards differences in law as representing a distri-
bution of probable litigation outcomes and internalizes their sum to deter-
mine its profit-maximizing investment in precautions. The firm responds to
this aggregate expected liability, just as it does to every other potential cost
and benefit of doing mass production business, by exploiting available scale
efficiencies through standardized adjustments to the safety and price of its
product, service, or process. In effect, the firm converts the varying laws of
each jurisdiction into the "average law," equivalent in substance to the
mean expected liability of the firm's total liability exposure under all laws.
Thus, there is no such thing as individualized or particularized sover-
eign-related contacts or interests in the world of multi-state mass produc-
tion. Each jurisdiction's law is merely an input to the mass producer's
calculus of the aggregate expected liability. This aggregation of law creates
an inevitable mutuality of interest among the states with each contributing
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a share of expected liability to the making of the aggregate law and, in
consequence of such contributions by the others, receiving an average level
of deterrence benefit from the firm's standardized response to its collective
liability exposure. The indivisibility of this aggregate is thus dictated by
social welfare as well as by business economics and statistical analyses. It
is possible, of course, to disentangle this solidarity of legal, economic, and
social interest, but not without jeopardizing the enormous welfare value
derived from the goods and processes of mass production.
d. Social Solidarity and Multi-State Class Actions
The social solidarity implicit in the furtherance and governance of
mass production justifies the use of state-convened multi-state class actions.
The argument that mandatory class action is needed to marshal scale effi-
ciencies for effective management of mass production risks is by now famil-
iar to the reader and, given the absence of other means of collective
adjudication, the requirement for multi-state class actions follows virtually
a fortiori.
Thus, in addition to overcoming potential limits of states' "sovereign"
interests, multi-state class action must also overcome the propensity of
states-as a practical matter-to assess the reasonableness of mass produc-
tion risk based on their respective needs and interests, rather than based on
the aggregate (or collective), inter-state needs and interests involved. Fail-
ure to overcome this propensity may result in a firm marketing products or
services or otherwise conducting inter-state activities that would be found
reasonable when the benefits and costs are assessed on a state-specific ba-
sis, but unreasonable when benefits and costs are assessed in the aggregate,
across all affected states.
Take a car designed without airbags, which is marketed and generates
a risk to passengers in two states. Suppose that the risk in each state totals
$50 and it costs $80 for a standardized design of a car that could deploy
airbags, which would avoid the risk entirely. If the courts of each state
determine liability based on the reasonableness of the design, but compare
the cost of $80 to supply airbags against the expected loss of $50 in their
respective states, each might well sustain the reasonableness (or non-negli-
gence) of the standardized design without airbags. However, the outcome
of such separate, state-specific decisions would deprive society of a reason-
able investment in safety, as $100 in aggregate expected loss would be
avoided by spending $80 to outfit the car with airbags. This socially detri-
mental outcome can be remedied most effectively by convening a multi-
state class action to evaluate the case from an aggregate, multi-state
perspective.
Of course, the example could easily be changed so that each state (or a
sufficient fraction of states) would prefer customized to standardized pre-
cautions with the result that the socially beneficial standardization would
be rendered economically unfeasible even though its adoption for all states
would minimize the sum of accident costs and make everyone in all states
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better off. In the reality of numerous and substantial variation in the dif-
ferences among states, many (if not the great majority) of mass production
cases will require assessment of one or more standardized designs to deter-
mine which if any minimizes total accident costs. To perform this task best,
a state must be willing to convene (or participate in) a multi-state class
action.
2. Design Options for Multi-State Class Actions
a. Structure
We consider two types of inter-state cases of mass production risk: (1)
those involving standardized goods (products or services), and (2) those
involving either standardized or some mix of standardized and customized
goods. This division provides a useful proxy for the complexity and cost,
including the need to enforce varying state laws, entailed by collectivized
adjudication of multi-state cases.
In the wholly standardized case, the liability questions presented con-
cerning reasonableness of the safety features are relatively straightforward,
at least in the sense that a Mississippi court is not called upon to determine
the reasonableness of customized precautions for some or all of the states
involved. Consequently, the motivation for, as well as structuring of, the
multi-state class action derives directly from the inter-state unity of inter-
ests discussed above. Thus, it is imperative that, in calculating civil liability
sanctions, the court employ an aggregate, inter-state assessment of the ben-
efits and costs of alternative safety measures that were or could have been
adopted by the firm. It is evident that convening a Mississippi-based multi-
state class action provides the best, most scale efficient means of accom-
plishing this law enforcement task. The application of Mississippi "law"
class-wide would further enhance the effectiveness of collective adjudica-
tion. Because of the collective interests that require aggregate, class-wide
assessment of the reasonableness of the product or service in question, Mis-
sissippi has good reason to apply its law to adjudicate the entire case. In
any event, because the states' interests are necessarily unified by the mass
production enterprise and the need to maximize social benefit from it,
there is little likelihood that any significant variance let alone "true con-
flict" will arise regarding the basic legal and factual elements of the reason-
ableness test required by the laws of the several states involved.
Even though Mississippi could apply its law throughout, it may choose
to recognize and enforce controls other states use to limit or expand (rela-
tive to Mississippi) imposition of liability and damages regardless of a find-
ing that the mass production risk is unreasonable. For example, some
states may limit liability to foreseeable risk, while others may apply a
"hindsight" test; some may authorize punitive damages, while others may
deny such awards in whole or in part; some may use a "discovery" test to
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toll time-bars, while others may not. Such legal and related factual vari-
ances can readily be managed and effectuated by sequencing and synchro-
nizing the multiple stages of pre-trial and trial proceedings, and by
requiring the jury to issue special findings and verdicts.
More complications are involved in the adjudication of the second sort
of case, where conditions in some fraction of states including Mississippi
may require customization. However, the additional complexity and cost
should not preclude use of multi-state class action. At the very least, col-
lectivization is required to determine whether and the extent to which stan-
dardized precautions could minimize total accident costs. For these
purposes, the class action structure outlined above should suffice. Con-
cerning customized precautions, a Mississippi class action court could adopt
either of two approaches for determining the socially appropriate level of
customized safety. First, the court could assess the reasonableness of the
various customized safety features, choosing and applying the laws of the
affected states. Second, the court could "farm-out" the customized safety
cases for resolution by class action in the states involved. If any state re-
fused to undertake the task, then the Mississippi class action court would
do the work. Under either approach, the Mississippi court would aggregate
the recoveries by judgment or settlement in Mississippi and in the other
states, and then distribute them in accord with insurance theory to maxi-
mize individual welfare.
The court could, of course, dismiss the suit regarding other state-based
claims following resolution of the defendant's Mississippi liability (regard-
less of whether liability requires standardized safety features for Mississippi
itself and some fraction of other states or whether it requires completely
customized treatment). However, truncating the class action would subvert
the collective interest in fully marshalling and exploiting scale efficiencies.
Despite variations of law and fact, there are virtually always significant cost
and quality gains from collectivization. Because of the enormous costs that
a court and the parties would incur in evaluating the potential gain from
collectivizing a given mass production case, as we have shown, it is best to
collectivize the case automatically. Because class counsel has no motive to
exploit non-existent scale efficiencies, the multiple mass production cases
will proceed as multiple class actions (or otherwise) in Mississippi or other
states just as they would in the absence of class action.
b. Financing
There is a chance that multi-state class action could substantially bur-
den Mississippi's resources for the benefit of non-residents, resulting in a
discouragement of its use.81 However, the proposed designs for handling
multi-state class actions mitigate these burdens. Similarly, Mississippi's
81. Indeed, increased cost alone has prompted at least one court to limit class certification to
resident class members. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39, 42 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996)
(restricting class to Florida residents "so that the Florida judiciary can efficiently manage the litigation
without undue burden to the taxpayers").
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costs could be reduced further by modifying the general decoupling struc-
ture developed in Part I for multi-state class actions. Under this modifica-
tion, the Mississippi class action court would determine class-wide liability,
and, depending on the outcome, assess the state's share of liability for dis-
tribution among resident class members. The class-wide judgment on lia-
bility would also bind non-resident class members. If favorable, it would
then support suits by such class members for recovery against the defen-
dant in the class members' home states. The laws of those states and the
non-common questions, such as time-bars or contributory negligence de-
fenses, would determine final resolution of non-resident claims. In effect, a
Mississippi-based multi-state class action would function as fully mutual-
ized ("two-way") mode of collateral estoppel.82
Even so, Mississippi would undoubtedly still incur increased adjudica-
tion costs for the benefit of non-residents. As discussed, multi-state class
action provides the opportunity for the Mississippi court to exploit far
greater scale efficiencies than would be available were the case restricted to
a statewide compass. Yet, fully exploiting these opportunities for reducing
the cost and raising the quality of adjudication entails commitment of judi-
cial resources, including expenditure of funds, for example, to set up a com-
puterized filing system, employ a special master, or empanel a group of
scientific experts. Most importantly, the court may incur added cost to ex-
pand the scope of adjudicating liability from a state-specific to a multi-state
assessment of the benefits and costs of various safety options. To be sure,
Mississippians will also share in proportion with residents of other states
the collective safety and insurance gains derived from scale-enhanced law
enforcement. Furthermore, Mississippi should expect that, as in other in-
stances of mutually-beneficial, inter-state law enforcement efforts, other
states would lend it some support, including contributions of resources, and
reciprocate by sponsoring inter-state class actions in other cases.83
Nevertheless, some financing gap may remain due to free-riding by
other states, and like the parties, a Mississippi court may well require
greater assurance of a return for the added investment in judicial resources
devoted to benefiting non-residents-people who do not pay taxes to fund
the Mississippi system of civil liability. The solution for such a problem is
simply for the Mississippi court to assess class counsel for the costs of adju-
dicating the non-Mississippi claims with provision for counsel to recover
those costs from the defendant in the event the class succeeds in winning a
82. See David Rosenberg, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation of Similar Claims: The Superiority of
Class Action vs. Collateral Estoppel vs. Standard Claims Market (Harvard Law & Economics Discussion
Paper No. 394, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=354100.
83. Notable examples of states working together in mutually beneficial law-enforcement efforts
include the Master Settlement Agreement, in which forty six state attorneys general agreed to settle
suits seeking reimbursement for smoking-related medical costs from several large tobacco companies
(the Master Settlement Agreement and its amendments are available at http://caag.state.ca.us/tobacco/
msa.htm), and the Microsoft antitrust litigation. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2000).
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judgment for class-wide liability.84 Another version of the cost-shift com-
ponent would tax the defendant for half the costs despite winning judgment
at trial, if the court had previously refused to enter summary judgment or
directed verdict against the class. Beyond the law enforcement benefits
from multi-state class actions, this cost-shift mechanism furthers deterrence
objectives by compelling mass producers to internalize, as part of the po-
tential accident costs resulting from a risky decision, the expense incurred
by courts to manage and adjudicate a multi-state class action.
85
c. Constitutionality
Questions of constitutional interpretation, as such, are beyond the
scope of this paper. However, we nevertheless explain how our proposal
for Mississippi-based multi-state class actions responds to intimations in
current U.S. Supreme Court decisions that suggest limits affecting both its
scope and mandatory nature. Specifically, the Court has asserted that
there may be "due process" bounds to a class action court applying forum
state law to govern all claims, including those of non-residents, and to exer-
cising personal jurisdiction over non-resident absentees without affording
them the chance of opting-out.86
Before addressing how our proposal responds to these potential limi-
tations on a Mississippi-based multi-state class action, it is important to un-
derscore that the Court has neither recognized the collective interests
involved in a mass production case nor actually applied its due process rul-
ings to such as case. The only case that involved mass production risk was
Ortiz v. Fibreboard,87 and there, the Court expressed the principle that
would sustain the use of multi-state class actions for law enforcement pur-
poses. To be sure, the context was use of mandatory class action to carry
out an equitable distribution of money from a common fund by adjudicat-
ing "rights of all participants in a fund in which the participants had com-
mon rights."88 It would pervert the notion of law in service of individual
well-being to deploy mandatory class action for protection of separate
monetary claims against an investment fund or the like, while refusing its
evident benefits to those whose unity of interests in security against risks of
catastrophic loss, including death, is not only an indivisible but also incom-
parable whole, greater than the sum of its parts (were such conceivable).
84. Non-resident class members would not be injured by such a tax, since the expected value
they derive from mandatory class actions would eclipse the amount they would have to pay Mississippi
for providing the service.
85. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL S-rUD. 575, 588 (1997).
86. Of course, this proposition implicitly presumes that the law creating the non-residents'
"claims" precludes mandatory application of the forum-state law in a multi-state class action even when
barring opt-out would best promote optimal deterrence and insurance. In view of the deterrence and
insurance rationales on which states generally justify the civil causes of action they create, courts should
determine rather than presume whether non-forum law dictates the socially destructive consequences
of opt-out.
87. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
88. Id. at 836, n. 14.
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Indeed, mandatory class action represents the only means within practical
reach for enforcing these "common rights.
89
In any event, our proposed designs for Mississippi-based multi-state
class action should satisfy constitutional muster. Specifically, our design
responds to due process limitations on application of forum state law to
resolve non-resident claims. First, the limits take hold only if there is a
"true conflict" between the laws of the forum and other states. In all
probability, no such conflict exists regarding the Mississippi law that would
govern the core of common questions determining liability based on class-
wide assessment of benefits and costs of the proffered safety alternatives.
Any state that enforced civil liability through multi-state class actions
would apply law fully or at least substantially identical in content regarding
these questions. Any state that confined enforcement to statewide class
actions or separate actions would generally apply law that confined the
evaluation to state-specific benefits and costs. Second, the preceding col-
lective interest analysis demonstrates that Mississippi (as does every other
state affected by the threat or implementation of a mass production risk)
has a "significant contact or aggregation of contacts" to the claims and un-
derlying mass production activities rendering choice of Mississippi law en-
tirely reasonable, let alone far from "arbitrary or unfair."9 Finally, we
stress that under our model, Mississippi law would determine only the com-
mon questions of liability relating to the reasonableness of a given stan-
dardized safety option relative to other standardized options as well as any
proffered customized options. If any customized option is found superior
to all standardized options for any state or group of states covered by the
class action (including Mississippi), then a judgment to that effect will issue
in defendant's favor relating to the standardized design bases for liability
and the balance of the case will be managed according to the "farm-out"
procedure discussed above.
The Court has also raised an impediment to mandatory class action,
positing that non-residents absentees may be subject to the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction by a multi-state class action court only if "provided with
an opportunity to remove [themselves] from the class." 91 Yet, that require-
ment applies only when the "absent class member's right of action was ex-
tinguishable" by class action judgment.92 Only common questions that
implicate collective interests are necessarily determined by the multi-state
class action.93 Under the decoupled model generally, every class member
89. Notably, the Court in Ortiz labored under a constraint, inapplicable to Mississippi courts, of
the federal Rules Enabling Act. See id. at 845.
90. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Mississippi's contacts would obviously
be "significant" in a situation where over two-thirds of the plaintiffs are Mississippians-as would be
necessary to remain in state court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (assuming the amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million). 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
91. Id. at 812.
92. Id.
93. It should be noted that the Court in Ortiz proceeded on the premise that when collective
interests warranted class action certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the due process requirement
for opt-out posed no barrier to mandatory collectivization.
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can prosecute his or here claim for damages on non-common questions
through separate counsel, in any venue he or she selects, and by trial to
judgment. Moreover, as noted above, the multi-state class action would
follow the "farm-out" procedure in all cases of "customized" safety.
D. Ability of Mandatory Class Actions to Avoid "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail" Settlements
Like individual lawsuits, class actions usually settle. However, unlike
individual lawsuits, mandatory class actions may involve thousands or even
millions of claims, with liabilities ranging up to the billions. With so much
at stake, many courts and commentators have argued that the class action
settlement process will inevitably lend itself to corruption. These critics of
class actions have focused largely on the danger of so-called "sweetheart"
and "blackmail" settlements. 94 In sweetheart settlements, class counsel al-
legedly settles meritorious claims for far less than they are actually worth-
essentially "selling out" the class-in order to maximize its net returns
from representation. 95 In blackmail settlements, on the other hand, de-
fendants are allegedly bludgeoned into settling cases for far more than they
are worth because class counsel is able to threaten the defendant with a
costly and risky trial. 96 Although these two complaints differ substan-
tively-one argues that class actions offer plaintiffs too little, while the
other argues it offers them too much-they have the complementary effect
of bolstering the case against collective adjudication. In the following dis-
cussion, we will scrutinize the underlying assumptions and validity of the
proposition that class actions cannot overcome the twin evils of sweetheart
settlements and blackmail settlements. Our overall conclusion is that the
risks posed by these phenomena have been overstated.97 We suggest that
the threat of sweetheart and blackmail settlements can be minimized
through appropriate class action safeguards, and therefore, class actions,
particularly mandatory class actions, constitute a fair and efficient means of
adjudicating (and settling) large-scale damage claims.98
1. Preventing Sweetheart Settlements
Many courts and commentators assail class actions on the basis that
class counsel shares a joint interest with defendant in "selling out" the
class. According to this theory, class counsel and the defendant both have
94. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 1377.
95. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852-53 & n.30 (1999).
96. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rhorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
97. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the very term "blackmail" settlement makes
little sense. Silver, supra note 79, at 1387-88 ("Neither law nor conventional morality treats settlement
demands in conventional lawsuits as blackmail attempts. Nor do those who assert that blackmail occurs
in class actions. They have praised settlements as alternatives to trials, and with but one exception, they
have served for years as judges in a civil justice system that strongly encourages parties to settle. They
reserve their ridicule for class action settlements.") (internal citations omitted).
98. This discussion of "sweetheart" and "blackmail" settlements relies heavily on Hay & Rosen-
berg, supra note 24.
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strong incentives to "negotiate" a settlement that maximizes attorneys'
fees, but gives class members less than fair value for their claims. In other
words, attorneys from both sides will collude to increase class counsel's
profits in exchange for decreasing the defendant's ultimate payment to
class members. Moreover, advocates of this theory assert that courts are
ill-equipped to detect such "sweetheart" settlements because the trial judge
depends heavily on the parties to supply information about the value of the
class' claims and therefore cannot easily verify whether a proposed settle-
ment accurately represents the class' full value. Assuming the reality of
such sweetheart settlements, we deny that the problem necessitates any re-
striction of the use of mandatory litigation class actions. Whatever the ac-
tual magnitude of the risk, courts have readily available means to deter
class counsel from making sweetheart deals. In the following discussion,
we will show how courts can discourage class counsel from "selling out" the
plaintiff class without sacrificing the benefits of mandatory class action ad-
judication. In particular, we argue that courts can prevent sweetheart set-
tlements (as well as other deficiencies in class representation) without
resorting to opt-out, sub-classing or other means of policing attorney
behavior.
To prevent class counsel from settling for less than the class' claims are
worth, the court must appropriately regulate class counsel's distributive
share of the settlement amount. That is, the court must ensure that class
counsel's fee does not exceed the share of a class recovery that class coun-
sel would have received in return for winning a favorable judgment at the
class action trial. To do this, the court need only make sure its fee-award to
class counsel pays a fractional share of the settlement recovery that does
not exceed the fractional share of the judgment the court would have paid
class counsel had the case gone to and succeeded in class action trial. So
long the class counsel's fee-award (whether based on a preset percentage of
recovery or lodestar analysis) pays a fractional share of the settlement that
is no larger than the fractional share he or she would have received from
the final judgment of damages at trail, the attorney will have no incentive
to settle for less than the class members' claims are worth in the aggregate.
That is, counsel will find it in his or her best interest not to "sell out" the
class.99
99. Although beyond the scope of this Article, we note that motivating class counsel to invest
optimally in maximizing the net aggregate value of the class claim requires pegging the fee award to the
optimal level of investment, neither more nor less. To avoid the difficulty of determining fee-awards as
well as the problems of sweetheart deals, courts could simply sell or auction the class claim to class
counsel. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1991). Better still, courts could promote an "ex ante" claims market by authorizing first-party commer-
cial and governmental insurers to acquire by subrogation complete ownership control over the prosecu-
tion of their insured's prospective (including pre-risk) tort claims. See David Rosenberg, Of End Games
and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 729-30 (1989);
Hay & Rosenberg, supra at note 24, n.17.
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This simple fee structure contrasts with the costly and inadequate al-
ternatives of opt-out, sub-classing, and judicial scrutiny. Opt-out exempli-
fies the common defects in all these information intensive alternatives. The
key to making opt-out a credible and effective sanction for class counsel
perfidy is determining whether class counsel has held out for the maximum
expected value of the class claim at trial. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that
class members could, on their own, obtain adequate information to make
an informed decision as to whether they should opt-out. The only people
who could make such a decision would be those who possess insider infor-
mation about any potential sweetheart settlements. Even here, however,
there is no reason why an insider would prefer communicating with class
members by opting-out (a costly proposition) instead of simply prompting
the court (in exchange for a fee, of course) to have class counsel investi-
gated, and if found delinquent, disciplined and/or replaced. More realisti-
cally, there is no reason why the insider would prefer the "reward" of
individually prosecuting his case, instead of a payment that the court can
fully and efficiently exact as part of the fine levied against offending class
counsel.100 Moreover, even if class members could effectively elicit the in-
formation themselves, there is no reason why they should be required to
opt-out and thus forfeit the investment benefits of class adjudication once
the illicit deal was uncovered and negated. Thus, attempting to use opt-out
as a mode of monitoring class counsel would have little or no upside, but
substantial downside-robbing plaintiffs of the scale efficiencies provided
by mandatory class adjudication.
2. Preventing Blackmail Settlements
Unlike critics who believe class actions offer plaintiffs too little, those
who believe class certification amounts to judicial "blackmail" believe col-
lective adjudication offers plaintiffs far too much. According to these crit-
ics, once a class is certified, defendants are bullied into paying plaintiffs a
handsome premium to avoid going to trial, even if the defendant's chances
of prevailing are very strong. Plaintiffs' recoveries, therefore, do not reflect
the merits of their claim; rather, they reflect the defendant's fear of staking
everything on a single trial. One of the most prominent enunciations of
class certification as judicial blackmail occurred in the widely discussed
case of In re Rhone-Poulenc Rhorer, Inc., 1' where the Seventh Circuit
overturned an order certifying a class of tort plaintiffs who allegedly con-
tracted HIV as a result of the defendant's negligent handling of blood
products. In the opinion, Judge Posner noted that since aggregate liability
could run as high as $25 billion, the defendants would be forced to make
the unenviable choice of either "stak[ing] their companies on the outcome
of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle
100. Class members' reward might come in the form of a fine paid by class counsel or of a mal-
practice liability judgment against the attorney. Alternatively, if the "whistleblower" is in fact an attor-
ney who was working with class counsel, he may be rewarded by replacing the wrongdoer.
101. 51 F.3d 1293.
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even if they have no legal liability .... ,102 Such a choice was made all the
more onerous by the fact that plaintiffs had lost twelve of the previous
thirteen trials involving non-class members who pressed similar claims.
10 3
Even assuming that the risk aversion to a single class action trial could
distort settlement negotiations to the disadvantage of the defendant rather
than the class and its counsel, there is a straightforward solution: simply
conduct multiple class trials to determine aggregate liability.
The entire blackmail problem, assuming it exists, is solved through the
use of multiple class trials (or simply trials conducted under the aegis of
mandatory class certification). Under a multiple class trial regime, the
court (or courts in different Mississippi jurisdictions) would conduct a set
of jury (or bench) trials sufficient in number and representativeness to
yield a basis for reliably estimating defendant's aggregate liability.
Whether the number, venues, and other details are set by the court or left
to the parties as in the normal course of separate action litigation, the op-
portunity for multiple trials would reduce the risks (to both sides) associ-
ated with going to trial for the simple reason that it is unlikely either side
will win (or lose) in a single class-wide trial.
To illustrate the point, assume a pharmaceutical company has devel-
oped a painkiller that approximately twenty five thousand individuals
purchase. After a few years, epidemiological studies suggest a correlation
between ingestion of this drug and the development of heart disease. As-
sume further that the plaintiffs have a twenty-five percent chance of recov-
ering $500 thousand each (for a total aggregate liability of $3.125 billion).
In such a setting, a single class trial is a highly risky proposition for both
sides. The class would have a seventy-five-percent chance of recovering
nothing if the case goes to trial, and the defendant would have a twenty-
five-percent chance of losing a staggering $12.5 billion at trial. Suppose,
however, that the court's policy is to hold a series of trials and award the
class an amount equal to the average of the amounts awarded by individual
juries. The odds drop substantially that the class will recover nothing or
that the defendant will lose everything as the number of trials increases-
the greater the number of trials, the lower the odds of an extreme outcome.
If the court holds two trials, the odds that the plaintiffs will recover nothing
drop to a little over 56%; if the court holds four trials, the odds drop to a
little over 31%; if the court holds ten trials, the odds drop to roughly five
percent, or one in eighteen, that the plaintiff will recover zero. In making it
far more likely that the class will recover damages (most likely averaging to
$3.125 billion), but less likely that the defendant will suffer a total loss
($12.5 billion), holding multiple class trials reduces the risk that single, all-
or-nothing, trial would impose.
Two points are worth emphasizing about the policy of holding multiple
trials. First, a multiple class trial regime neither increases nor decreases the
overall liability exposure of defendants or recovery by classes. Rather, it
102. Id. at 1299.
103. Id.
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simply affects the variance (risk) in the possible actual outcomes and
makes it more likely that the class' actual recovery after concluding the
series of trials is approximately equal to the expected recovery. Second,
the multiple class trials approach can be adapted for both general and spe-
cial verdict trials. In special verdict trials, the court could discount the ulti-
mate damage award by the percentage of verdicts favorable to the
defendants. For example, if only one-fourth of the juries return a verdict
against the defendant, the ultimate award would be discounted to one-
fourth the aggregate damages. And finally, conducting multiple class trials
would not simply recreate the wasted costs of fractionated class litigation.
Courts could streamline the process to reduce redundant trial costs, for
example, by convening and averaging the judgments of more than one jury
in a single trial, or employing video-taped testimony in several trials. The
parties themselves might increase efficiency by confining the scope of mul-
tiple trials to contentious issues. Most importantly, in contrast to the frac-
tionated class process, a multiple class trial regime assures plaintiffs the
same scale efficiencies defendants naturally enjoy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, of course, our conclusion is the same as it was in the begin-
ning: nothing short of complete mandatory collectivization of all claims as-
sures that civil liability can accomplish its law enforcement mission of
optimally deterring unreasonable risk and, when appropriate, optimally in-
suring harm from reasonable risk. The use of civil liability under study
governs virtually all risk-taking by mass producers-governments as well as
businesses-and hence virtually all civil litigation aside from automobile
accidents. Litigations involving defective products, discrimination, and
toxic exposure merely exemplify the significant and varied potential for
mass production designs and policies to place large populations at greater
chance of death, crippling disease and trauma, destruction of livelihood
and property, and invidious discrimination. It is crucial to bear in mind,
however, that while mass production processes, products, and services gen-
erate systematic risk, the ability of businesses and governments to exploit
the efficiencies of large-scale, standardized means of production also in-
creases individuals' chances of surviving and prospering in this world of
prevalent danger and scarce resources. Indeed, if not for the availability of
mass production processes and goods, most people in the world would be
impoverished or dead.
Courts thus play an important role in the overall effort by the law
enforcement system to manage mass production risks. This law enforce-
ment effort consumes trillions of dollars annually in seeking to reduce
these risks to reasonable, socially appropriate levels and to insure against
hazards that cannot be avoided by reasonable investment in precautions.
Like administrative agencies and executive law enforcers, courts must
strike the balance of benefit and risk from mass production that best en-
hances individual well-being. In terms of civil liability, the objective is to
[VOL. 24:153
2005] CLASS ACTIONS: TO BE OR NOT TO (B)(3)? 215
minimize total accident costs, including the costs of precautions, unavoided
harm, insurance, and transactions. Even under the most favorable circum-
stances, this task of marshaling, evaluating, and taking appropriate action
upon the relevant information is daunting.
However, Mississippi has the chance to strike this balance between
risk and reward more effectively than any state has before. Through adop-
tion of a mandatory litigation class action rule, Mississippi can chart a new
course in civil law enforcement, blazing a path for all other states to follow
in the future.

